The Right to Representation by Out-of-State Attorneys in Civil Rights Cases by Sherman, Edward F.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1968
The Right to Representation by Out-of-State
Attorneys in Civil Rights Cases
Edward F. Sherman
Indiana University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sherman, Edward F., "The Right to Representation by Out-of-State Attorneys in Civil Rights Cases" (1968). Articles by Maurer Faculty.
Paper 2257.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2257
THE RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY OUT-OF-STATE
ATTORNEYS IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
Edward F. Sherman
I. INTRODUCTION
One result of the civil rights movement of the 1960's was
to make legal services available to a substantial number of
southern Negroes to whom they had never before been available.
Due to the hostility of southern lawyers to the civil rights move-
ment out-of-state attorneys were largely responsible for this
accomplishment. Southern lawyers, supported by local and
state bar associations refused to provide legal assistance in1 "
civil rights cases, and so soithern courts, under pressure
from the activist Fifth Circuit and the media, permitted out-of-
state attorneys to act as defense counsel for Negroes and civil
rights workers. However after the large demonstrations and
mass arrests subsided and civil rights la-, practice in the South
shifted from defense to affirmative suits the lenient attitude of
southern courts towards out-of-state attorneys began to change.
*
Teaching Fellow and LL. M. candidate Harvard Law
School. A. B., Georgetown, 1959; LL. B., Harvard 1962; M. A.,
Texas, 1967.
1
See Pollitt, Counsel for the Unpopular Cause: The
"Hazard of Being Undone, " 43 N. C. L. Rev. 9 (1964); Pollitt,
Timid Lawyers and Neglected Clients Harper's Magazine, Aug.,
1964 at 81-86; Frankel The Alabama Lawyer. 1954-64: Has the
Official Organ atrophied ? 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1243 (1964).
2See Note, Judicial Performance in the Fifth Circuit
73 Yale L. J. 90 (1963); Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit:
A Crisis in Judicial Administration 42 Texas L. Rev. 949(1964); S. Fingerhood The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Southern Justice 214(L. Friedman, ed. 1965).
3
A review, made by the author of the annual Docket
and Case Report of the Lawyers' Constitutional Defense Com-
mittee for pending Mississippi cases as of September, 1965,
shows 65 defensive actions (involving over 1000 individuals
most of them arrested in mass demonstrations) and 26 affirma-
tive actions. The same docket as of March 1, 1968 shows only
12 defensive actions and 22 affirmative actions (most of them
involving challenges to government laws, practices, and
agencies).
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Southern bar associations withdrew from agreements with civil
rights legal organizations, courts promulgated restrictive rules
to bar practice by out-of-state attorneys, and criminal prosecu-
tions were filed against out-of-state attorneys for the unauthor-
ized practice of law. This summer two cases involving attempts
to bar out-of-state attorneys from civil rights practice in the
South were decided by federal courts, establishing for the first
time, that out-of-state attorneys could legally serve as counsel
in civil rights cases. In Sobol v. Perez a three-judge court
in the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled that a northern lawyer
working for a civil rights organization in Louisiana who repre-
sented Negro clients in association with local counsel in non-fee
civil rights cases could not be prosecuted under the Louisiana
unauthorized practice of law statute. In Sanders v. Russell and
Anderson v. Cox 5 (consolidated for decision), the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals granted a writ of mandamus against two federal
judges in the Southern District of Mississippi and held invalid
their rule which severely restricted the right of out-of-state
attorneys to appear before the court when applied to non-fee
civil rights cases. 6 These decisions, although limited in their
holdings, represent the first judicial recognition of a constitu-
tional right to be represented by an out-of-state attorney in non-
fee civil rights cases. Whether this right will be applied to the
wide variety of civil rights cases in which out-of-state lawyers
are now involved in the South or in non-civil rights situations
such as poverty law cases, where there is also doubt that the
client can obtain sympathetic representation by a local lawyer
is still to be decided. A consideration of the case law governing
admission to practice and the unauthorized practice of law in
light of the Sobol and Sanders cases is needed to predict the
future scope of the newly recognized right to representation by
an out-of-state attorney. I
4 Sobol v. Perez No. 67-243, (E. D. La., July 22,
1968).
5Sanders v. Russell No. 25815 (5th Cir., Sept. 18,
1968).
6
"The limitation to non-fee generating cases does not
preclude petitioners from seeking attorney fees in appropriate
cases. The award of attorney's fees pursuant to Titles II and
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. A §§ 2000 a-3(b),
2000 e-5(d); Newman v. Piggie Park Amusement Co., 36 U. S.
L. W. 42, 43 (U. S. March 18, 1968) is not in conflict with a
policy of refusing to accept fees from clients. " Sanders v.
Russell, No. 25815 (5th Cir., Sept. 18, 1968) at 6 n. 5.
II. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO
THE PRACTICE OF LAW
A. General Admission to Practice before State and Federal
Courts
The power to regulate the practice of law within a state
is divided between the state legislature and the highest court of
a state with some conflict among authorities as to the extent of
the power in each. It is generally considered that a state legis-
lature, in the exercise of its police powers may prescribe$ J 7standards for bar admission and the practice of law. On the
other hand the power to regulate the practice of law has been
held to be an inherent power of the judiciary8 allowing the highest
court of a state to establish rules of its own for admission to the
bar.
The conflict of authority does not often arise because the
courts have generally been willing to follow statutory standards,
either by adopting them as their own or by not questioning the
authority of the legislature to make them. However a statute
which established different standards for admissibility than the
rule of the state supreme court has been held invalid, 9 and
supreme courts have imposed stricter standards than those
called for by statutes. Thus, the Mississippi Supreme Court
has stated that although the statute does not consider free out-
of-court advice to be the practice of law, the court is not bound
by the statutory definition and may impose stricter restrictions
on civil rights volunteers. 10
7E.g.,,La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37, ch. 4, Reporter's
Notes (1964): . [ I] n the exercise of its police power the
Legislature may prescribe minimum standards for admission to
the bar and may aid the court in its exercise of its power to dis-
bar .... "
8
E.g., State ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114,
180 N. E. 2d 157 (1962); N. J. Const. art. 6, § 2, para. 3; S. C.
Code 56-96 (1962).
9Liebtag v. Dilworth, 25 Pa. D. & D. 2d 221 (C. P. 1962);
State ex rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N. E. 2d 157
(1962), State ex rel. Ralston v. Turner, 141 Neb. 556, 4 N. W. 2d
302 (1942).
10
Darby v. Board of Bar Admissions, 185 So. 2d 684
(Miss. 1966) (dictum).
The rules governing admission to the practice of law,
whether statutory or court-promulgated, usually create an admini-
strative Board of Bar Admissions to administer examinations
determine qualifications of candidates and decide which candi-
dates will be granted admission. This board is usually appointed
by the highest court of the state or the governor or both, and the
state bar association often plays a role in the selection process
such as preparing a list of nominees for the board. 11 The board
is delegated certain powers either by statute or rule of the
highest court and is usually subject to the direction of the highest
court. However, like many regulatory agencies of the executive
department, it usually acts according to rules, regulations and
procedures of its own with relative independence from the highest
court.
There are usually three basic eligibility requirements for
admission to the practice of law in a state, residency in the state
for a certain period, passing of a bar examination and certifica-
tion of good moral character and fitness. The Board of Bar
Examiners generally makes determinations in respect to these
qualifications which are accepted by the highest court without
review. An aggrieved applicant who objects to denial on the
grounds of violation of statutory or constitutional standards can
obtain judicial review under customary administrative law
standards. 12
Once an attorney has been admitted to the practice of law
in a state he is entitled to practice before all of the courts of
11
E.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann., Articles of Incorporation
of the Louisiana State Bar Association, art. XII, § 1 (1964);
Ala. Code tit. 46, §§ 21, 22 (1958) (Board of Commissioners
elected by the members of the state bar).
I 2A discussion of the precedents involving denial of
admission to the bar is beyond the scope of this article. Konigs-
berg v. State Bar 366 U. S. 36 (1961), In re Anastalpo, 366 U. S.
82 (1961), and Spevack v. Klien 385 U. S. 511 (1967) (disbar-
ment proceeding) indicate the problems raised by adverse charac-
ter determinations and invocation of the fifth amendment by
applicants. See generally Rosenberg, Constitutional Limitations
on the Process of Admission to the Bar 23 N. Y. U. Intra. L.
Rev. 135 (1968); Sprecher, Due Process Generally in Bar Admis-
sions 35 Bar Exam. 33 (1966); Note The "Right" to Practice
Law, 1 Duke B. J. 249 (1951); Jackson, Character Requirements
for Admission to the Bar, 20 Fordham L. Rev. 305 (1951).
13
first instance in that state. Admission to practice before the
appellate courts of the state often requires some additional but
relatively simple, application procedure. The attorney also has
the right to conduct an office practice within the state and to per-
form all acts constituting "the practice of law. " In states which
have integrated bar associations, 14 a lawyer must be a member
in good standing in the state bar in order to practice law. How-
ever bar admission is ordinarily coincident to admission to
practice by the highest court of the state, and the payment of
dues is the only requirement to maintain membership in the bar.
Although admission to the state bar is usually a perman-
ent status entitling the attorney to practice in the state at any
time whether or not he continues to reside there, some states
require compliance with additional standards for the continuance
of the privilege of practicing within that state. The classic
example is the Kansas rule promulgated by statute and state
supreme court rule, 15 that an attorney admitted to practice in
Kansas may not practice in the state if he regularly practices
outside the state and is a member of the bar of the place of his
regular practice. In Martin v. Walton 16 the Supreme Court
upheld Kansas' right to apply this rule against an attorney who
lived in Mission, Kansas, had law offices in both Mission and
Kansas City, Missouri and was a member of the bar of both
states. Justice Douglas' dissent indicates possible constitutional
problems, which will be discussed in a later section of this
article, but the decision supports the authority of the state to
condition the right to practice law under its police power. How-
ever, this type of limitation, obviously designed to prevent com-
petition from lawyers specializing in interstate practice has
not been exercised by other states.
Admission to practice before federal courts is determined
by rules prescribed by the Supreme Court and the lesser federal
13
But see Pa. Stat. tit. 17, §5 1606, 2071 et. seq.
(1962) (additional but summary requirements to practice in
state superior courts in Pennsylvania).
14 There are 26 states with integrated bars. Countryman,
The Scope of the Lawyer's Professional Responsibility, 26 Ohio
St. L. J. 66, 88 (1965).
15
Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 54; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 7-104 (1964).
16368 U. S. 25 (1961).
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courts. This power derives from the Supreme Court's "judicial
power" granted in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution and
from express recognition of such power by the Congress. 28
U. S.C. § 2071 (1964) provides:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the
conduct of their business. Such rules shall be consistent
with Acts of Congress and rules of practice and procedure
prescribed by the Supreme Court.
The requirement in the last sentence that "such rules shall be
consistent with Acts of Congress" would seem to provide a possi-
ble source of conflict with the Supreme Court's Article III "judi-
cial power, " but Congress has not attempted to invade the broad
rule-making power of the courts and the federal courts have
acknowledged the need for their rules to be "consistent with Acts
of Congress. i17 Each federal court establishes its own stand-
ards for admission to that particular court. 18
Since federal courts do not administer their own bar
examinations they must rely upon passage of a state bar exami-
nation to determine the competency of a lawyer. 19 Most federal
courts do not attempt to determine the moral character and fit-
ness of applicants, but must rely upon state bar determinations.20
17
See Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F. 2d 280, 284
(5th Cir. 1964); accord, Brown v. City of Meridian, 356 F. 2d
602, 605 (5th Cir. 1966); Sanders v. Russell No. 25815 (5th
Cir., Sept. 18, 1968) at 8.
18The text of the rules for the federal courts are con-
tained in 28 U S.C Rules- Revised Rules of the Supreme Court
of the United States (Supp. 1966), 28 U. S. C. Rules- United
States Courts of Appeals Rules (1964), as amended (Supp. 1966);
Federal Local Court Rules (Callaghan and Co. 1967).
19
However, state disbarment is not binding on federal
courts. See Theard v. United States, 354 U. S. 278 (1957);
Selling v. Radford, 243 U. S. 46 (1917). But see D. Colo. R.
4(e) (automatic disbarment in the federal court upon disbarment
from practice in the Colorado state courts).
20E.. S. D. Cal. R. 1(c) ("good moral character");
N. D. Ill. R. 6(a)(i), (ii) (affidavits concerning applicants charac-
ter). See generally Crotty, Requirements for Admission to Prac-
tice in Federal Courts.
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Therefore it is not surprising that most federal district courts
require only admission to the highest court of the state in which
the federal court is located as a prerequisite for general admis-
sion to the federal court. 21 Some federal district courts have
additional requirements such as membership in the state bar
for a certain period 22 residency within the district or the state
for a certain period2 (in addition to the state bar residency
requirements) or, for non-residents maintenance of an office
in the district or the state. 24
An important aspect of rules governing admission to
federal courts is that although membership in the state bar
usually provides automatic admission to the federal court, out-
of-state attorneys may also be granted general admission. The
federal circuit courts of appeal, which serve a number of states
and obviously cannot limit admission only to attorneys who are
members of the bar in the state in which they sit, not only grant
admission to attorneys who are members of the bar of states
under their jurisdiction, but also to attorneys admitted to
21 See Sanders v. Russell No. 25815 (5th Cir., Sept.
18, 1968) at 12.
22
See Note, The Practice of Law by Out-of-State
Attorneys 20 Vand. L. Rev. 1276, 1294-95 n. 89 (1967) for
analysis of ten "representative" district courts' admission rules.
Two of the ten require some length of state bar membership, 1.
Mass. R. 2 (one year); S. D. N. Y. R. 3(a) (one year for N. Y. bar
members; no similar requirement for members of Vt., Conn.,
or N.J. bars).
2 3 Two of the ten district courts restrict admission to
residents D. Mass. R. 2 (residents of state district); E.D. Mo.
R. II(1) (Mo. residents must reside within district, non-Mo.
residents within county adjacent to district, but must associate a
resident member for appearances).
2 4 Two of the ten district courts require residency or
maintenance of an office within the district. S. D. Cal. R. 1(c)(1);
D. Colo. R. 4(b). Three require no local office but condition
appearances upon presence before the court of a member with a
local office. S. D. Fla. R. 15 (office within state); D. N. J. R. 5
(office within state- district); S. D. N.Y. R. 4(a) (office within
either S. D. N. Y. or E. D. N. Y. ). One requires the non-resident
applicant to have an office within the judicial district. E. D. Mo.
R. If(l). Three have office requirements for all applicants.
S. D. Cal. R. 1(c)(1); D. Colo. R. 4(b); E. D. Pa. R, 5(a).
25practice before any federal district court. Thus most of the
New York staff members of the civil rights legal organizations
involved in southern civil rights practice have been generally
admitted to practice before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
and can practice before that court in any case at any time. 26
Federal district courts also offer general admission to
out-of-state attorneys. Some will grant general admission to
an out-of-state attorney who is a member of the bar of a state
in which the federal district courts extend a corresponding privi-
lege to their attorneys. 27 Some will admit an out-of-state
attorney who comes from a neighboring or bordering state and
is a member of a federal district court there. 28 These "reci-
procity" and "neighboring state" rules were adopted at the urg-
ing of local lawyers who desired to obtain a similar favor from
district courts in other states.
Over one-third of the federal district courts offer general
admission to attorneys who are not members of the state bar. 29
Their only requirements are that the attorney be admitted to
another federal district court and that he provide evidence of
this fact. A number of out-of-state civil rights attorneys have
been admitted to practice in the Northern District of Mississippi,
the Eastern District of Louisiana and the Southern District of
25
See 28 U. S. C. Rules--United States Courts of Appeals
Rules (1964), as amended (Supp. 1966). E.g., First Cir. R.
7(1) (admission to any attorney admitted to practice in the U. S.
Supreme Court, another court of appeals, any U. S. district
court or the highest appellate court of any state upon oral
motion of a member of the bar of the First Circuit).
2 6 Brief for Petitioners at 4, Anderson v. Cox No.
25815 (5th Cir. 1968). Sobol v. Perez No. 67-243 (E. D. La.,
July 22, 1968) at 5.
27 E- - , S. D. N. Y. R. 3(a) (admits members of N. Y. bar
and members of state and district court bars in Vt., Conn., and
N. J. whose district courts extend a corresponding privilege to
attorneys of S. D. N. Y. ).
28E.g., N. D. Ill. R. 6(a) (admits members of bars of
Wis. and Ind.).
29Brief for Petitioners at 15, Anderson v. Cox, No.
25815 (5th Cir. 1968).
30
Alabama. The trend has been toward general admission of
any lawyer admitted to another federal district court on the
theory that his qualifications to practice before a federal court
would not vary from state to state.
B. Pro Hac Vice Admission to Practice before State and Federal
Courts
Pro hac vice literally "for this turn, "31 is a limited
admission to practice before a court for one particular lawsuit.
Pro hu vice admission only applies to litigation before a
court and, therefore, only provides permission to do those
acts incident to the prosecution of the particular case. It would
not, for example, provide permission to have an office practice,
write a will draft documents, or advise clients in a non-litiga-
tion setting.
The requirements for pro hac vice admission to state
courts are established either by statute or court rule. Whether
court rules will be written varies from court to court. Since
the judge administers the rule, he has a great deal of discretion
even when there are express statutory standards. The usual
procedure is for an out-of-state attorney to be introduced,
either by a local attorney or by letter to the judge of the court
as a member in good standing of the bar of another state and to
request that he be granted admission pro hac vice for all
matters pertaining to the case at hand.
A common requirement for pro hac vice admission is
that an out-of-state attorney associate a local attorney with
him. 33 In most states the local attorney need only be a
member of the state bar, although some states require that he
be a resident of the court or of the judicial district where the
3 0Id. at 15 n. 19.
3 1 Black's Law Dictionary 1363 (4th ed. 1951).
32
See Note The Practice of Law by Out-of-State Attor-
neys supra note 22, at 1302
33E.g La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:214 (1964) (out-of-state
attorney "temporarily present" in the state forbidden to practice
"unless he acts in association with some attorney duly licensed
to practice law by the Supreme Court of this state. ").
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34
court is sitting. The state interest in such a rule would appear
to be to insure that a local attorney is associated in the case who
is familiar with local law and procedure, who can be served with
process and papers, and who can be held responsible for any vio-
lations of professional ethics or court rules. Another important
purpose of this requirement is to prevent out-of-state lawyers
from taking away fees from local lawyers.
In some states, there is no requirement that a local
lawyer be associated when the out-of-state lawyer comes from
a state which gives similar "reciprocity" to its lawyers. The
Louisiana statute, for example, permits an out-of-state lawyer
to practice in the state without associating a local lawyer if he
comes from a:
3 5
. . . state which, either by statute or by some rule of
practice accorded specific recognition by the highest
court of that state, has adopted a rule of reciprocity
that permits an attorney duly licensed and qualified to
practice law in this state to appear alone as an attorney
in all courts of record in the other state without being
required to be admitted to practice in such other state,
and without being required to associate with himself
some attorney admitted to practice in the other state.
36
"Reciprocity" and "comity" privileges are the products of an
earlier period of less interstate commerce when states were
still able to establish barriers against outsiders and when bar
associations felt it necessary to lobby for such statutes to insure
that their attorneys received privileges elsewhere. It is doubt-
ful that there are still valid policy reasons for their continuance.
Apart from the administrative problems created by requiring a
court to take notice of another state's laws and court rules on
admission of lawyers to practice, these privileges are unhealthy
for both the administration of justice and the efficient practice
of law.
34
See Letaw v. Smith 223 Ark. 638, 268 S. W. 2d 3 (1954)
(county residence requirement held to violate state law but state
residency requirement proper); Arthaud v. Griffin, 202 Iowa
462, 210 N. W. 540 (1926) (county residence requirement upheld);
Bradley v. Sudler, 174 Kan. 293, 255 P. 2d 650 (1953) (judicial
district residency requirement upheld).
3 5 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:214 (1964).
3 6 See note 27 supra.
Even apart from the special consideration given to law-
yers who come under the "reciprocity" rule, pro hac vice admis-
sions are usually granted freely by state court judges. Despite
local lawyers' displeasure at the usurpation of their clients by
out-of-state specialists, strong professional tradition dictates
that out-of-state attorneys be treated with courtesy, and judges
have not usually used unreasonably their discretion to deny pro
hac vice admission. However, civil rights attorneys have had
an increasingly difficult time in obtaining pro hac vice admis-
sions in southern courts. They are, of course, somewhat
different from the usual out-of-state lawyers who are granted
admission so easily. Since civil rights lawyers are not private
attorneys working for a fee, they are often not easily accepted
as members of the legal fraternity. They are usually young
lawyers. The fact that they appear in the role of social reformer
does not endear them to southern judges and local bars. Since
the judge's discretion is broad these characteristics of out-of-
state civil rights lawyers make pro hac vice admission more
difficult for them than for other out-of-state lawyers.
Pro hac vice admission in federal courts is determined
by rules of the particular court. In federal circuit courts of
appeal and over one-third of the federal district courts which
readily grant general admission to out-of-state attorneys, there
is no need for pro hac vice rules. All other district courts
except two, grant pro hac vice freely to out-of-state attorneys,
some requiring hat the attorney be admitted to another federal
district court , some requiring presentation by a local attor-
ney, 3 and some requiring association with a local attorney. 39
The two exceptions are the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey which limits pro hac vice appearances of
any attorney to three per calendar year, 40 and the United States
3 7 See Brief for Petitioners at 15 n. 19, Anderson v. Cox,
No. 25815 (5th Cir. 1968) for description of rules of the 76 dis-
trict courts with published rules.
3 8 d. at 20 n. 20.
39Id.
4 0 D. N. J. R. 4(C). "The Clerk of the District of New
Jersey informed counsel for petitioners that the Rule was
designed to prevent New York and Philadelphia lawyers from
monopolizing lucrative commercial cases, especially FELA
cases, and was waivable in the kind of case for which there was
little competition among New Jersey lawyers. " Id. at 20 n. 21.
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District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, whose
restrictive pro hac vice rule was struck down in the Sanders
decision. 41
III. SOUTHERN COURTS BEGIN TO ENFORCE UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE STATUTES AND RESTRICTIVE COURT
RULES AGAINST OUT-OF-STATES CIVIL
RIGHTS ATTORNEYS
Out-of-state volunteer lawyers went into the South in
sizeable numbers for the first time in the summer of 1963, and
their numbers increased substantially in 1964 and 1965. At
first most out-of-state attorneys were short-term volunteers,
many of whom spent only several weeks of vacation in the South.
They were usually sponsored by one of the civil rights legal
organizations and worked out of temporary civil rights legal
offices or offices of Negro attorneys licensed to practice in the
state. Whenever possible they associated and were accompanied
by a member of the local bar in each case. However, because
of the small number of Negro attorneys in certain southern
states (there were only four in Mississippi at the start of the 43
civil rights movement 4 2 and only 12 out of 2200 lawyers today4 )
and the refusal of virtually all white lawyers to assist in civil
rights cases 44 it was not always possible for them to associate
4 1 Rule as to Nonresident Attorneys, United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, promulgated Sept.
26, 1967; Amendment to Rule, promulgated Nov. 10, 1967.
422 United States Commission on Civil Rights Hearings
321 (1965).
4 3 Sanders v. Russell No. 25815 (5th Cir., Sept. 18,
1968) at 7.
4437 Miss. L. J. (May, 1966) was devoted to a "Sympo-
sium on Southern Justice" with replies from the members of the
Mississippi bar to the criticisms contained in Southern Justice
(L. Friedman ed. 1965). The replies indicated little change in
attitude towards accepting representation in civil rights cases.
E.g., "The Southern bar has refused and I think rightfully so,
to become free counsel for a band of professional self-styled
protestors, crusaders, and demonstrators " Attorney General
Patterson at 37 Miss. L. J. 404-05. Luckett, "Clarksdale
Customs " id. at 423 states that civil rights workers do not
want an attorney but "'a propagandist who would use [the] case
as a platform from which to launch an attack against our social
-76-
with a member of the local bar. In such cases it was customary
for the out-of-state attorney to participate in the case without
a formal request for pro hac vice admission and for the judge
and prosecutor not to raise any question concerning his lack of
admission to the local bar.
45
All but one of the civil rights legal organizations which
brought volunteer lawyers to the south were created after the
beginning of the large demonstrations. Since they were devel-
oped to cope with the legal problems of a mass movement, they
displayed from the very beginning a dissimilarity from the tradi-
tional forms of American legal practice. The first substantial
hurdles for the civil rights legal organizations were the canons
of ethics of the organized bars. The American Bar Associa-
tion's Canons of Professional Ethics expressly forbid group
legal services (Canon 35), solicitation (Canon 27), and stirring
up litigation (Canon 28). 46 However, in 1963 in NAACP v.
Button 47 the Supreme Court held that a plan by which the
NAACP recommended lawyers to Negroes and paid their fees
was protected by the first and fourteenth amendment rights of
speech, assembly and petition. In 1964 (Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar48 ) and 1967
(United Mine Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion4 9), the Court held group legal services were constitutionally
order. No lawyer worthy of the name would lend himself to any
such project; certainly not if he was not himself at war with our
social order and bent on its destruction. " In the hearings before
the Three-Judge Court in Sobol v. Perez, No. 67-243 (E. D. La.,
July 22, 1968), a Louisiana attorney who had testified that he
would not hesitate to take a civil rights case was asked on cross-
examination: "Q. So that if three Negroes from Chicago came
down and picketed the courthouse in Pointe a la Hache because
they had white and colored drinking fountains and were arrested
you would not represent them? A. I would not; I am a white man
first and foremost. " Record vol. 6, at 188.
45NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund Inc.
46
The Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association (1967).
47371 U.S. 415 (1963).
48 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
49389 U.S. 143 (1967).
protected against bar association attack. Thus, by the time
that the civil rights legal organizations began to function in the
summer of 1964, there was strong judicial support for the
organizational form of civil rights law practice. 50 Only the
limitations imposed on the right to practice by out-of-state attor-
neys posed a serious problem.
Three major civil rights legal organizations have spon-
sored most out-of-state lawyers practicing in civil rights cases
in the South since 1964: The NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, Inc. (usually referred to as "The Legal Defense
Fund" or "The Inc. Fund"), the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law (originally called "The President's Committee"
and now called "The Lawyers' Committee"), and the Lawyers'
Constitutional Defense Committee (usually referred to as LCDC).
Although the first major program to provide volunteer out-of-
state attorneys for the South was the National Lawyers' Guild's
"Project Mississippi" in the early summer of 1964, 51 the other
three organizations entered with sizeable numbers of lawyers in
the same summer and rapidly became the primary agencies for
civil rights practice in the South.
The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund Inc. was
established by the NAACP in 1939 but has since become independ-
ent of the NAACP. It served for years as the only legal assist-
ance group for the struggling civil rights movement in the South.
Its organizational structure has always been less calculated to
result in conflict with local practice laws than the two newer
civil rights organizations because it has relied upon "cooperat-
ing attorneys, " most of whom are Negroes licensed to practice
law in their states. There are now some 250 "cooperating
attorneys" in the southern states. 52
The "Inc. Fund" has long been the prime force in school
desegregation cases. It represented the plaintiffs in Brown v.
Board of Education 5 3 and even now handles most of the school
5 0 One of the organizations, LCDC, applied and received
an opinion from the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics
of the ABA which found its program "clearly within the standards
and practices of the ABA. " Opinion 78, Dec. 24, 1964.
5 1National Lawyers' Guild, Project Mississippi 2-3
(1964).
5 2 Legal Defense Fund Report 1966, 2, 3, 23.
53347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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cases being brought. U" Because of heavy work loads and lack of
expertise, most of its participating lawyers cannot do the legal
research, prepare the pleadings and briefs, nor perform the
appellate arguments required in "test-cases. " It therefore has
a permanent staff working in its New York City office who fly to
the South when necessary to handle various "test-cases. " In the
past the permanent staff members in Mississippi have not been
members of the local bar 55 but the two staff members presently
in Mississippi are members of the Mississippi bar.
The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law was
established in June, 1963 at the request of President John F.
Kennedy, by concerned northern lawyers representing a number
of prestigious law firms and the American Bar Association. 56
It began in the summer of 1964, sending only volunteer lawyers
into Mississippi. Like the Legal Defense Fund it associated
local Negro attorneys with its volunteer attorneys whenever
possible in cases requiring formal pleadings before a court but
large numbers of its volunteers were able to serve as defense
counsel without association in criminal cases involving civil
rights workers. 57 A field office was established in Jackson in
June, 1965, and was operated by out-of-state volunteers until
September, 1966, when a member of the Mississippi Bar was
hired as staff attorney. The staff attorney is now assisted by
5 4 Brief for Petitioners at 13, Anderson v. Cox, No.
25815 (5th Cir. 1968).
55Brief for Petitioners at 4, Anderson v. Cox, No.
25815 (5th Cir. 1968).
56President Kennedy invited 250 lawyers to the White
House on June 21, 1963, and urged them to help activate the Bar
to provide legal assistance in defense of civil rights. "The
Lawyers' Committee then was formed and through the vigorous
leadership (and some prodding) by Co-Chairmen Harrison Tweed
of New York and Bernard G. Segal of Philadelphia, the Commit-
tee's members came to include an impressive roster of leaders
of the Bar: the President-Elect and eight past presidents of the
American Bar Association; the president or a past president of
more than half of the state bar associations. " Honnold The
Bourgeois Bar and the Mississippi Movement 52 A. B. A. J. 228,
229 (1966).
57 See Brief for Petitioners at 8, Sanders v. Russell, No.
25797 (5th Cir., Sept. 18, 1968).
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five other attorneys, none of them members of the Mississippi
bar 58 but two of whom have now taken and passed the Missis-
sippi bar exam.
The Lawyers' Constitutional Defense Committee was
incorporated as a non-profit charitable corporation in the State
of New York on May 22, 1964, for the purpose of "providing
without cost and assisting in the obtaining of legal counsel to
persons engaged in activities aimed at achieving the equal pro-
tection of law and other rights guaranteed by the Constitution of
the United States and who are unable to obtain such counsel with-
out assistance. ,59 It was formed by legal representatives of a
number of social action groups 6 0 in anticipation of the need for
an independent lawyers' committee unconnected with any other
civil rights group, which could provide northern volunteer law-
yers to protect and defend civil rights workers and Negroes in
the summer of 1964.
In the summer of 1964, LCDC had no staff counsel, but
relied entirely on some 150 volunteers who served for three- or
four-week periods in the offices of Southern Negro lawyers. It
scattered its lawyers throughout the communities of five states
Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The
volunteer lawyers, usually unaccompanied by members of the
state bar, were permitted to serve as defense counsel in state
5 8 1d. at 9.
59
Certificate of Incorporation, quoted in Post-Trial
Brief for Plaintiffs at 6, Sobol v. Perez No. 67-243 (E. D. La.,
July 22, 1968).
6 0 President: Leo Pfeffer, General Counsel, American
Jewish Congress; Vice-President: John M. Pratt, Counsel,
Commission on Religion and Race National Council of Churches;
and Carl Rachlin, General Counsel, Congress of Racial Equality;
Secretary: Melvin L. Wulf, Legal Director American Civil
Liberties Union, Treasurer: Edwin J. Lukas, National Affairs
Director, American Jewish Committee; Directors: Robert L.
Carter General Counsel, N. A. A. C. P.; Rev. Robert F. Drinan,
Dean, Boston College Law School; Jack Greenberg, Director-
Counsel, N. A. A. C. P. Legal Defense Fund; Clarence B. Jones
Counsel to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.; and Howard Moore Jr.,
Counsel Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Brief for
Plaintiffs at 6, Sobol v. Perez No. 67-243 (E. D. La., July 22,
1968).
and federal courts without objection. 61 LCDC found, however,
that volunteer attorneys were in the South for too short a period
to be effective and that spreading its attorneys over a large area
was inefficient. In early 1965, Alvin J. Bronstein, a New York
lawyer, became director with two main offices in Jackson,
Mississippi and New Orleans. 62 A third office in Selma, Ala-
bama, was opened in early 1966 but was closed about a year
later.
LCDC has an Executive Secretary, Henry Schwartzschild,
at its national office in New York City, but he maintains no legal
staff there. The New Orleans office is directed by Richard
Sobol (who replaced Alvin Bronstein when he took a leave of
absence to become a Fellow at the Institute of Politics, John F.
Kennedy School of Government. Harvard University), who is not
a member of the local bar and two Louisiana-licensed staff
attorneys. The Jackson office is directed by two staff attorneys,
one a member of the Mississippi bar and one not. LCDC has
taken fewer short-term volunteers each year, with the bulk of
the legal work now done by its staff attorneys.
All three legal organizations achieved a modicum of
acceptance during the 1964-65 period of mass arrests. In some
localities judges became familiar with civil rights attorneys and
dealt with them as though they were members of the bar.
In Mississippi, where all three organizations established
offices, the state bar went so far as to enter a formal agreement
with the most moderate of the three civil rights organizations
The Lawyers' Committee, whereby The Lawyers' Committee
was "to temporarily locate an office in this State and take over
the defense of said parties [those who are charged with viola-
tions of law in connection with the enforcement of civil rights]
and work with the Bar. -63 The Board of Bar Examiners was to
extend its "cooperation" to the Lawyers' Committee which
apparently meant that it would not question the right of out-of-
state lawyers to represent civil rights clients and to perform
activities incident to the running of an office in Mississippi. Al-
though the other two civil rights legal organizations were not
included in the resolution the Mississippi bar also acquiesced




63Quoted in 38 Miss. L. J. 532-33 (Oct. 1967).
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of out-of-state attorneys in the courts.
As the mass demonstrations and arrests began to subside
after the summer of 1965, the increasing attacks by southern
lawyers and politicians on out-of-state civil rights lawyers indi-
cated the end of the uneasy truce which had permitted them to
practice. At approximately the same time bar officials and
judges in three states--Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi--
acted to forbid practice by out-of-state civil rights attorneys.
The first action came on November 16, 1966, when Donald A.
Jelinek, a New York lawyer who was staff counsel for LCDC's
Montgomery, Alabama office was arrested in Demopolis
Alabama and charged with practicing law without an Alabama
license. 64 He was arguing two appeals from lower court con-
victions of a white civil rights worker at the Marengo County
Circuit Court. After arguing the first appeal in the morning
without objection from the judge or prosecution, he was ordered
by the judge, during the trial of the second appeal, to take the
stand. He was questioned concerning his practice of law without
a license and, apparently by prearrangement, was then arrested
and taken to the County Jail. This procedure was a strange way
for the court to protect itself from unauthorized practice, as the
customary method would have been for the court to have refused
Jelinek admission, and then if he refused to abide by the
court's ruling, to use its contempt powers. The manner in
which the arrest was made, with the court first permitting him
to practice before it and then suddenly acting as the investigatory
arm of the law, was irregular and would have raised substantial
questions, both constitutional and otherwise as to how a refusal
of pro hac vice admission can be made and how the unauthorized
practice of law statutes can be applied. However, these issues
were never litigated as Jelinek agreed to leave the state (for
personal reasons involving a change of jobs) and the charges
against him (which had been joined by the Alabama Bar Commis-
sioners) were dropped. 65
The next episode in the tightening of admissibility require-
ments came in Louisiana when, on February 26, 1967, Richard
B. Sobol, a staff member of the LCDC New Orleans office and a
Washington lawyer who had originally taken leave from the firm
of Arnold, Fortas, and Porter was arrested in Plaquemines
Parish Louisiana for "practicing law without a license." Sobol
6 4 N. Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1966 at 7, col. 1.
65Jelinek v. Boggs, No. 4338-67 (S.D. Ala.), dismissed
by stipulation, Mar. 6, 1967.
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was arrested while presenting a post-trial motion to the judge of
the Twenty-Fifth Judicial Court in a criminal case 6 6 involving
civil ri hts issues which he had tried without objection a month
before. "6 7 He was associated in the case with a Negro law firm
Collins, Douglas, and Elie, but had tried the case alone.
Sobol's arrest had an immediate effect upon the willing-
ness of Louisiana courts to permit civil rights lawyers to prac-
tice before them. Two days after the arrest, Leander Perez,
Jr., District Attorney of the Twenty-Fifth Judicial District
wrote letters to a number of district attorneys around the state
warning them that Sobol was not licensed to practice in the
state. 68 As a result, Sobol received warnings from a number
of district attorneys and courts not to attempt to practice. He
made no state court appearances after February 21, 1967. 69
Other civil rights attorneys in Louisiana began to experience
similar problems. Parishes which had previously permitted
them to practice without question, now began to refuse them
admission. 70
The new hard line displayed by the arrest of Richard
Sobol in Louisiana was adopted in Mississippi at about the same
time. First the state bar association established an Unauthor-
ized Practice of Law Committee to investigate the practice of
law by out-of-state civil rights attorneys. 1 Bar leaders who
had entered into an agreement with the Lawyers' Committee "to
66The defendant, a Negro, was accused of a battery on a
white boy when he attempted to assist two Negro boys who had
integrated an all-white school under court order and were being
threatened by a group of white boys. He was convicted but the
conviction was reversed in a landmark Supreme Court decision
which established a constitutional right to a jury trial in mis-
demeanor cases involving serious penalties. Duncan v.
Louisiana, 88 S. Ct. 1444 (1968).
67
Amended Complaint at 8-10, Sobol v. Perez, No. 67-
243 (E. D. La., July 22, 1968).
68
Brief for Plaintiffs at 114, Sobol v. Perez, No. 67-243
(E. D. La., July 22, 1968).
69Id. at 115-16.
70Id. at 121-24.
71 See 38 Miss* L* J. 533 (1967).
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take over the defense" in civil rights cases only two years
before now expressed surprise and indignation that "certain
out-of-state lawyers [are] apparently practicing law in our
state without a proper Mississippi license. ,,72 On April 7
1967, the Bar Commissioners rescinded the 1965 agreement to
cooperate with the Lawyers' Committee on the grounds that "the
decline in the activities for the problem specified in the original
resolution indicates that problem no longer exists. -73
Then on September 26, 1967, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi promulgated a
rule, called the "comity rule, " governing pro hac vice admis-
sions which stated that attorneys who reside in Mississippi but
who are not members of the bar may not appear in that court
and that out-of-state attorneys who do not reside in Mississippi
would only be admitted to practice before that court:
7 4
1) in "one case in any calendar year, or within the space
of twelve months "
2) if "such attorney has been admitted to practice for at
least five years before the court of the state from
which he or she comes unless it be shown to this
Court that the federal court of such state from which
the attorney comes admits attorneys from Mississippi
to practice by comity under a more favorable or
relaxed rule "
3) on a motion to admit "presented to the Court for an
order not later than at the motion day for the session
of Court at which the particular case is set for trial"
and accompanied by an affidavit providing certain
information
4) if the motion or affidavit "does not show on the face of
the affidavit that the nonresident attorney is entitled to
72N. W. Overstreet, Jr. President of the Mississippi
State Bar in "The President's Corner " 14 Miss. Lawyer 2
(Sept. 1967).
73 14 Miss. Lawyer 2 (May-June, 1967). See 38 Miss.
L.J. 534 (1967).
7 4 Rule as to Nonresident Attorneys, U. S. District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi, promulgated Sept. 26,
1967.
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the relief requested" a committee appointed by the
judge will be required to "consider, hear, and recom-
ment" proper action.
The rule was clearly aimed at the civil rights legal organizations.
The one-case-a-year rule for non-resident out-of-state lawyers
could effectively prevent staff attorneys from New York and
Washington from coming to Mississippi to assist with and argue
cases before the court. The rule barring resident out-of-state
attorneys in all cases would prevent any staff attorney who
lived in Mississippi from practice before the court. To make
sure that the rule could not be avoided by using members of the
Mississippi bar for court appearances, it was also provided that
attorneys not admitted to the court may not "participate in any
manner or to any extent in any discovery proceeding for or as
an attorney (or present any matter to the Court for an order); or
affix his name or permit his name to be affixed to any motion or
pleadinX in any case before this Court as attorney for any liti-
gant. " '0 An Attorneys' Committee made up of a former Presi-
dent of the Mississippi Bar Association and four other Missis-
sippi lawyers was empowered to receive all applications for
admission by nonresident attorneys and to make a "hearing and
report and recommendation to the Court as to its proper action
thereon. "76
The new pro hac vice rule had an immediate effect upon
civil rights cases in the Southern District of Mississippi. Legal
Defense Fund attorneys who were not members of the Mississippi
bar ijre serving as counsel in seven pending desegregation
suits and Lawyers' Committee attorneys were serving as
counsel in two pending civil rights cases. 7 8 Marian Wright, a
Negro member of the Mississippi bar was associated in the
7 51d. at 1-2.
76
Amendment to Rule as to Nonresident Attorneys, U. S.
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, promul-
gated Nov. 10, 1967.
77
See Brief for Petitioners at 1, Anderson v. Cox, No.
25815 (5th Cir. 1968).
78 Sanders v. Halbert, No. 3949 (S. D. Miss. 1968);
Shaffer v. Palmertrea, No. 405 (S.D. Miss. 1968). Both cases
involve suits for damages brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983
against state and local law enforcement officials for alleged
deprivation of federal civil rights.
-85-
Legal Defense Fund cases, and Lackey Rowe Jr., a white
member of the Mississippi bar was associated in the Lawyers'
Committee cases but it was obvious from the number of cases
in which they were involved that they could not carry the cases
through by themselves. On October 17 1967, Marian Wright
filed applications requesting leave to associate two Legal
Defense Fund attorneys who were then residing in Mississippi
(Paul and Iris Brest) and two who resided in New York (Jack
Greenberg and Melvyn Zarr). 7 9 After four months' investiga-
tion by the Attorneys' Committee, Judge Cox substantially denied
the applications. 8U Lackey Rowe, Jr. filed similar applications
to associate two Lawyers' Committee attorneys (Jonathan
Shapiro and Lawrence Aschenbrenner) which applications were
also substantially denied by Judge Russell. 81 On February 20,
1968 the Lawyers' Committee filed a Petition for Mandamus to
declare the court's pro hac vice rule void and to order Judge
Russell to grant pro hac vice admission in the future to out-of-
state counsel in nonfee civil rights cases. On February 27, the
Inc. Fund filed a similar mandamus action against Judge Cox.
Thus, by the spring of 1968, the lines had been drawn on the
issue of the right of out-of-state attorneys to practice in civil
rights cases. The application of unauthorized practice prosecu-
tions, as in the Sobol case and of exclusionary court rules, as
in the Sanders and Anderson cases promised to bring an end to
participation by out-of-state lawyers in civil rights practice in
the South.
7 9 Application of Marian E. Wright, No. 4207 (S. D. Miss.).
Applications were also filed in each of the seven school desegre-
gation cases. Mason v. Biloxi Municipal Separate School Dist.,
No. 2696(S) (S. D. Miss. 1968) and Gladney v. Moss Point Muni-
cipal Separate School Dist., No. 3004(S) (S. D. Miss. 1968).
8 0 The two attorneys not living in Mississippi (Zarr and
Greenberg) were permitted to continue in 5 and 7 cases respec-
tively, in which they were listed as original counsel but were
denied admission in all other cases. The two attorneys living
in Mississippi (Paul and Iris Brest) were found not to be "non-
residents" and denied admission in all 7 cases and, by implica-
tion all other cases. Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 14-15,
Anderson v. Cox, No. 25815 (5th Cir. 1968).
8 1 Aschenbrenner was granted admission in Sanders as he
had not appeared in the district within the preceding 12 months
but was denied admission in Shaffer as he had now used up his
one case. Shapiro was granted admission in Shaffer, but not in
Sanders. Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 4-5, Sanders v.
Russell, No. 25797 (5th Cir. Sept. 18, 1968).
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IV. THE DECISIONS IN SOBOL v. PEREZ AND
SANDERS v. RUSSELL
The day after his arrest, Richard Sobol filed a complaint
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana, New Orleans Division, for himself, the defendant
whom he was representing as defense counsel at the time of his
arrest, and all other persons similarly situated, asking that the
Louisiana unauthorized practice statutes be declared unconstitu-
tional and that the Louisiana officials be enjoined from prosecut-
ing him thereunder. The United States intervened on behalf of
the plaintiffs and certain individual Southern lawyers, the
Criminal Courts Bar Association, the State of Louisiana and
the Louisiana State Bar Association intervened on behalf of the
defendants. 82
Sobol sought from the court, as stated in his brief:
8 3
(8) A declaratory judgment that Mr. Sobol's representa-
tion of clients in non-paying civil rights cases in
Louisiana, in association with Collins, Douglas and
Elie, is not unlawful under L. S. A. - R. S. 37: 213, 214;
and that it is constitutionally protected ....
and urged that the court's holding be broad enough to establish a
constitutional right for out-of-state lawyers to practice in any
state in non-fee civil rights cases in which a member of the state
bar had been associated. The United States took the position that
Sobol's prosecution violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, on two alternative theories:84
(1) that the arrest and prosecution of Sobol was a form of
harassment undertaken without basis in law or fact for
the purpose of deterring him and other lawyers similarly
situated from helping to provide legal representation in
civil rights cases; or (2) that without regard to the pur-
pose of the arrest and prosecution, it represents an
unconstitutional application and construction of section
214 of Title 37 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes because
such an application and construction of the state statute
82Sobol v. Perez, at 3-4.
83
Brief for Plaintiffs 138-39, Sobol v. Perez, No. 67-
243 (E. D. La., July 22, 1968).
8 4 Sobol v. Perez, No. 67-243 (E. D. La., July 22, 1968)
at 4
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deprives persons of a much needed source of representa-
tion in civil rights cases without serving any legitimate
state purposes.
Because Sobol was seeking to enjoin a state court prosecution
he and the United States as intervenor raised the Dombrowski v.
Pfister 85 grounds that his prosecution was undertaken as a form
of harassment, without basis in law or fact, and in bad faith and
that unless enjoined, it would have a "chilling effect" upon first
amendment rights. The United States argued that the court
should not decide the case on the nonconstitutional ground (see
(1) above) but should reach the claim of the unconstitutionality
of the Louisiana statute (stated in (2) above) so that possible
"chilling effect" of the statute would be curtailed in the future. 86
Thus it asked for a decision:
8 7
(1) delineating the constitutional limits for the applica-
tion of section 214;
(2) imposing a criminal intent requirement on the appli-
cation of the criminal sanction of section 214;
(3) retaining continuing jurisdiction of the case so that
interested persons can apply to this court to construe
the meaning of the decree and the permissible constitu-
tional limits of a state criminal action under section 214.
Sobol and the United States did not obtain the broad hold-
ing based on constitutional grounds for which they had hoped.
The three judge court, composed of Circuit Judge Ainsworth and
District Judges Heebe and Cassibry, filed a per curiam opinion
on July 22, 1968 which granted the injunction against Sobol's
prosecution but which expressly relied on nonconstitutional
grounds. The court reviewed Sobol's representation of Duncan,
for which he was arrested and determined that under the
Louisiana unauthorized practice statute this was not the unauthor-
ized practice of law:
8 8
85 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
86






Sobol's representation of Duncan was not unauthorized
practice of law under LSA-R. S. 37: 213-214. Essentially
section 213 provides that no natural person, who has not
first been duly and regularly licensed and admitted to
practice law by the Supreme Court of Louisiana, shall
practice law in the state. Section 214 qualifies this in
one way, among others, by providing that no person
licensed or qualified to practice law in another state and
temporarily present in Louisiana shall practice law in
Louisiana unless he acts in association with some attor-
ney duly licensed to practice law by the Supreme Court
of the state .... Sobol was temporarily present in the
state. He did not then, and does not now, have any inten-
tion of remaining in the state permanently. He was in
association with local counsel when Collins of Collins
Douglas and Elie went with him to the Plaquemines court
and introduced him as a lawyer from Washington, D. C.,
associated with him in the case.
Although the court took pains to indicate the narrowness of its
holding, it is to be noted that its finding that Sobol was not
covered by the Louisiana statute required a liberal reading of
the statutory exception. Sobol had been living in New Orleans
with his family since August, 1966, and, although he had always
claimed an intent not to establish a residence there and to return
to the North he was still residing in Louisiana at the time of
the decision. Thus, the court's decision permits a rather broad
definition of the phrase "temporarily present in Louisiana "
apparently making the intent of the attorney himself the con-
trolling factor. The court has also given a liberal meaning to
the phrase "acts in association with some attorney duly licensed
to practice " indicating that such associated member of the bar
need not be present at hearings and trial and that in the absence
of an express requirement by the judge written motions for asso-
ciation are not required.
It is conceivable that the Louisiana legislature could now
delete the exception from its unauthorized practice statute and
thus create the question whether after Sobol a civil rights attor-
ney in similar circumstances can be prosecuted for the unauthor-
ized practice of law. Although the Sobol decision emphasizes
compliance with the statutory exception, there is language in the
decision which indicates that, absent the exception, Sobol might
still be protected from prosecution. In determining whether
Sobol was entitled to injunctive relief the court states: 8 9
89Id. at 16-17.
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We have concluded under the circumstances of this case
that this was an unlawful prosecution which was under-
taken for purposes of such harassment [referring to
plaintiffs' charge of "unconstitutional harassment" ],
which served no legitimate interest of the State, for
which no adequate remedy at law exists in the state
courts, and which causes irreparable injury to Gary
Duncan and other Negroes in need of representation in
civil rights cases.
90
Later in the opinion the court states:
The circumstances surrounding the arrest and charge
against Sobol, and the course of the Duncan case con-
vince us that Sobol was prosecuted only because he was
a civil rights lawyer forcefully representing a Negro in
a case growing out of the desegregation of the Plaque-
mines Parish School system.
and again:
9 1
This prosecution was meant to show Sobol that civil rights
lawyers were not welcome in the parish, and that their
defense of Negroes involved in cases growing out of civil
rights efforts would not be tolerated. It was meant also
as a warning to other civil rights lawyers and to Negroes
in the parish who might consider retaining civil rights
lawyers to advance their rights to equal opportunity and
equal treatment under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The court was forced to consider constitutional issues in deter-
mining whether Dombrowski-type injunctive relief should be
granted, and the language quoted above is specifically related to
that question. However, the language indicates that although
the court intentionally rested its decision on nonconstitutional
grounds, there are constitutional rights involved in the Sobol
case which could justify a broader holding. For example, the
court's recognition that a prosecution undertaken for purposes
of harassment "served no legitimate interest of the State"
9 2
would appear to present a constitutional challenge to such
90
Id. at 18-19.
9 1Id. at 21.
9 2 Id. at 16.
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prosecutions even if there were no compliance with a statutory
exception. The court's recognition that such prosecutions might
chill the exercise by civil rights lawyers and Negroes of "rights
to equal opportunity and equal treatment under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 1,93 would appear to
provide a constitutional defense to such prosecutions apart from
a statutory exception. The Sobol decision has left many ques-
tions unanswered but, despite its insistence on a nonconstitu-
tional holding, it appears to offer support for a constitutional
argument in a case not blessed with a statutory exception.
The decision of the Fifth Circuit in Sanders v. Russell
provides stronger support for the conclusion that there is a con-
stitutional right to representation by an out-of-state attorney in
non-fee civil rights cases, although its holding is also rather
narrowly circumscribed. The Fifth Circuit in a decision filed
on September 18, 1968 by Circuit Judge Dyer and joined by
Chief Judge Brown and District Judge Garza, issued the Writs
of Mandamus and invalidated the rule of the district court. The
petitioners had urged that:9 4
The Rule as to Nonresident attorneys, on its face and as
applied to petitioners, unduly restricts pro hac vice
admissions in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi, and is plainly incon-
sistent with the Constitution of the United States with
federal statutes and with proper principles of federal
court practice.
and specifically alleged violation of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause, the first and fourteenth amendments the mandate
of 42 U. S. C. § 1988 (1964) 9 5 and 28 U.S. C.
93 Id. at 21.
94
Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 17, Anderson v. Cox,
No. 25815 (5th Cir. 1968).
9 5
"The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred
on the district courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title
18, for the protection of all persons in the United States in their
civil rights, and for their vindication shall be exercised and
enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States so far
as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all
cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient
in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and
punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and
96§ 2071. The Fifth Circuit took a more narrow view of the
rule's invalidity. It found that although federal district courts
have broad discretion in prescribing requirements for admission
to practice before them, a rule which operated "in such a way
as to abridge the right of civil rights litigants to use the federal
court" 9 7 contravenes the express direction by Congress to "the
federal courts to use that combination of federal law common
law, and state law as will be best 'adapted to the object' of the
civil rights laws, 1198 and so violates the requirement in 28 U. S. C.
S 2071 that rules "be consistent with Acts of Congress. " The
Fifth Circuit reviewed the possible interests which the district
court and the Mississippi bar might have in such a rule to pre-
serve decorum and dignity, maintain high levels of professional
ethics, protect the financial or economic interests of the mem-
bers of the Mississippi bar, and assure a high quality of repre-
sentation. It found that these interests were not threatened by
admission of out-of-state attorneys in non-fee civil rights
cases. 99 Thus since the rule served no valid regulatory inter-
est of either the District Court or the Mississippi Bar, and
since it had an adverse effect upon the exercise of litigants'
rights to retain counsel of their own choice the Court of Appeals
invalidated the rule under its supervisory power over district
courts. The court stated the scope of its decision in specific
terms:
10
The petitioners' position is simply that they have a
federal right to retain counsel of their choice who are
changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the
court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held
so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the
said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause and if it
is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the
party found guilty."
96
See text following note 16.
97
Sanders v. Russell, No. 25815 (5th Cir., Sept. 18,
1968) at 8.
9 8 Id. at 8, quoting from Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg,






attorneys in good standing at their respective bars and
are associated with locally-admitted counsel in non-fee
generating school desegregation and civil rights cases
in federal court. This case does not involve the right
of non lawyers to practice law. This case does not
involve the right to practice in state courts. This case
does not involve the right to general admission to a
federal district court. This case does not involve the
right of attorneys to be admitted pro hac vice without
association with locally admitted counsel. This case
does not involve fee-generating cases.
It is to be noted that the Fifth Circuit does not use the
constitutional language which was pressed upon it by the peti-
tioners and that even when it speaks of "rights" of litigants it
does so not in terms of a constitutional right but in terms of a
"federal right" either to use the federal court or to retain
counsel of one's own choice. It appears to have viewed the Con-
gressional mandate that the federal courts use the law to facili-
tate the vindication of civil rights as an important factor and to
regard the "federal right" to use the courts as arising as much
out of the proper administration of the federal judiciary as out
of the Constitution. However notions of equal protection due
process, and privileges and immunities have obviously influ-
enced the court's recognition of such a federal right, and despite
the lack of constitutional language it would seem that the deci-
sion rests upon a constitutional footing.
One important aspect of the Sanders decision as it
affects the future of civil rights practice in the South is the
Fifth Circuit's discussion of the limitations which the decision
imposes upon future rules of the district courts. The court in
an apparent attempt to set out some guidelines observes that
"only reasonable limits can be placed on a federal litigant's
choice of counsel. 1,101 It would be reasonable to establish
requirements "to insure that the same counsel will continue in
the case until it is concluded" 1 0 2 or to "refuse to admit a lawyer,
otherwise qualified, on a showing that in any legal matter
whether before the particular district court or in another juris-
diction, he has been guilty of unethical conduct of such a nature
as to justify disbarment of a lawyer admitted generally to the bar
of the court. ,1M Such conditions should cause no problems for
101
Id. at 13.




civil rights legal organizations as they have all shifted from
using short-term volunteer lawyers to using staff lawyers, and
the ethical standards of out-of-state civil rights lawyers have
never been questioned. As if to emphasize its intention to insure
that district court rules comply with its standards, the Fifth
Circuit added a footnote at the end of the opinion stating that
another rule promulgated by the District Court for the Southern
District of Mississippi while this case was being argued which
required that "every lawyer who signs or permits his name to
be listed as counsel . . . shall appear in person... " "is
overly broad and thus invalid as applied to non-fee generating
civil rights cases. "104
While Sobol and Sanders were pending, it was anticipated
that at last there would be a determination as to the scope of the
right of out-of-state lawyers to practice in non-fee civil rights
cases. But they have been decided on narrow grounds, and at
best the uncertainty has only been slightly diminished. Sobol
clearly absolves civil rights lawyers from the charge of unauthor-
ized practice in Louisiana (and states having a similar exception
for attorneys "temporarily in the state" who have associated a
local attorney) and extends this exception to a lawyer who has
lived in the state for several years without intent to become a
resident and who is not actually assisted in the proceeding by
the associated lawyer. Sanders clearly forbids a federal dis-
trict court from denying pro hac vice admission to an out-of-
state lawyer in non-fee civil rights cases where there is an
"inadequate reservoir" 1 0 5 of attorneys willing to take such cases.
These narrow holdings still leave some uncertainty as to the right
to civil rights practice by out-of-state lawyers. There is still no
clear protection from unauthorized practice prosecution where
there is no Louisiana-type statutory exception and no clear right
to practice in non-fee civil rights cases in state courts. It is
necessary, therefore, to consider both the common law and
constitutional limitations on a state's power to regulate the prac-
tice of law through admissions requirements and unauthorized
practice prosecutions to determine what scope should now be
given after Sobol and Sanders to the right of out-of-state attor-
neys to practice.
104Id. at 15 n. 10.
1 0 5 Id. at 7.
V. EXCEPTIONS TO THE APPLICATION OF STATE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW STATUTES
Unauthorized practice of law statutes are a principal
mechanism for enabling states to regulate the practice of law.
The usual state statute makes the unauthorized practice of law
a misdemeanor with a maximum punishment of $500 to $1000
and/or a jail sentence of 6 months to 2 years. 106 These statutes
are ordinarily found not in the state Penal Code, but among the
statutes concerning "Attorneys at Law " so the crime is closely
related to statutes governing admissibility to the bar and con-
duct of the legal profession.
What is considered "unauthorized practice of law" is
usually dependent upon a statutory definition of the "practice of
law " plus any judicial or administrative gloss. The statutes
vary a good deal in defining the practice of law some providing
only a general definitionl 0 and many enumerating specific
activities, such as representing litigants in court and preparing
any papers incident thereto, preparation of a legal instrument,
and rendering opinions regarding real estate. 10- Many use
broad all-inclusive language, such as the Georgia statute which
includes "any action taken for others in any matter connected
with the law"1 0 9 and the Alabama and Louisiana statutes which
include "any act in a representative capacity in behalf of another
tending to obtain or secure for such other person the prevention
or the redress of a wrong or the enforcement or establishment
of a right. "110
106E... Ala. Code, tit. 46, § 31 (1958) (fine not to
exceed $500, imprisonment not to exceed 6 months or both); Fla.
Stat. Ann. , § 454. 23 (1965) (fine of $1000, imprisonment for 12
months); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 84-8 (1953) (a misdemeanor punish-
able by fine, imprisonment, or both "in the discretion of the
court"); S. C. Code Ann. § 56-141 (1962) (fine of $500 for every
cause he represents or solicits).
107E.g. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 84-2.1 (1953) (any legal
service with or without compensation).
108E.g. Ga. Code Ann. § 9-401 (1937).
109
Id.
1 1 0 Ala. Code tit. 46, § 42(c) (1958); almost identical
language is used in La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:212(c) (1964).
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There are a number of exceptions to the unauthorized
practice statutes either by common law development or by
express statutory exception, such as the exception for lawyers
"temporarily in the state" which was involved in Sobol. Some
of these exceptions appear to have constitutional overtones, but
most of them were developed in a period of limited extension of
the Constitution, and so they generally rest on nonconstitutional
grounds. Certain of the exceptions may apply to out-of-state
civil rights lawyers, and, if the constitutional right to practice
is limited, resort to such exceptions may, as in Sobol, provide
a modicum of protection for civil rights practice.
A. Exceptions for Certain Businesses and One's Own Business
A number of statutes single out activities of certain non-
lawyer businesses as not constituting the practice of law. For
example, abstract and title companies are authorized to make
abstracts of title and provide opinions as to title (but not to
draft deeds conveyances, mortgages and other legal documents)
in Alabama, 111 and banks may give advice to customers relating
to legal matters and draw up their own legal documents in1121
Georgia. Some statutes also exclude from the practice of
law an individual's doing his own legal business. For example,
a citizen is not prohibited from caring for his "own business
claims or demands " in Alabama. 113
Most of these statutes and other non-statutory rules per-
mitting certain groups to perform legal services have resulted
from compromises between the legal and related non-legal pro-
fessions, They represent the power of certain groups such as
the banks, abstract companies, and accountants, to insure that
their right to perform certain acts is protected. Although these
exceptions were clearly not designed for the civil rights situa-
tion, there may be room in some states to argue for a statutory
construction which permits a Negro to be assisted by an out-of-
state attorney on the grounds that he is merely caring for his
"own business claims or demands. " If a businessman is per-
mitted to write his own leases and contracts often with the
assistance of his non-lawyer employees, might not a Negro be
assisted by an out-of-state attorney in preparing and filing a
complaint charging discrimination by a public housing authority
illAla. Code tit. 46, § 42(d) (1958).
112Ga. Code Ann. § 9-401 (1937).
113Ala. Code tit. 46, § 42 (1958).
or bringing a Title II suitI14 against a discriminating place of
public accommodation? The presence of these statutory excep-
tions for special interest groups raises a constitutional argu-
ment based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment (which will be discussed more fully in a later section).
The state's alleged interest in insuring that all legal work is
done by local attorneys appears already to have been compro-
mised and the fact that bankers and businessmen are excepted
while out-of-state civil rights attorneys, who offer the only
legal service available in civil rights cases are not raises a
substantial constitutional question.
B. "For Consideration" Rule
A number of statutes including the provisions of the
Alabama and Louisiana statutes quoted above distinguish
between activities in connection with litigation before a court or
administrative body and legal advice in a non-litigation setting,
with the provision that legal services performed in the latter
case do not constitute the practice of law if not done "for a con-
sideration. " This could be an important exception in civil rights
and poverty law cases where there is usually no fee. An
advisory opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
recognizes this in stating that "[t ]he gratuitious furnishing of
legal aid to the poor and unfortunate without means in the pur-
suit of any civil remedy as a matter of charity, [does ] not con-
stitute the practice of law. "115 The fact that the statutes of
Alabama 116 Louisiana, 117 and Mississippi 1 1 8 have this excep-
tion probably accounts for the form which the attacks upon out-
of-state lawyers took in the Jelinek and Sobol cases. The states
were forced to find a litigation setting in which to bring unauthor-
ized practice charges.
114
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Public Law
88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U. S. C. § 1971, permits injunctive
and civil actions to be brought by the Attorney General on account
of discrimination in public accommodations.
1 1 5 Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 289 Mass. 607,
615, 194 N. E. 313, 317-18 (1935); accord, State v. Adair, 34
Del. 585, 586, 156 A. 358, 359 (1922).
116Ala. Code tit. 46, § 42 (1958).
1 1 7 La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37:212 (1964).
118 Miss. Code Ann* § 8682 (1956).
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It is conceivable that this statutory exception could be
removed or that charges could be brought against civil rights
lawyers for performance of "office practice" functions on the
grounds that civil rights lawyers who are receiving a salary
from a civil rights organization are performing services "for a
consideration. " Thus, although this exception provides at the
moment a substantial loophole for civil rights law office prac-
tice, it is not a very satisfactory long-range safeguard. The
loophole is also of limited value today since the bulk of the legal
work being done by civil rights lawyers involves litigation and
affirmative suits.
C. "Mere Investigation" Rule
1 19A few courts, including the Supreme Court of Louisi-
ana have held that activities which involve only investigation
of the law and the facts, as opposed to providing legal services
in connection with a case do not constitute the practice of law.
Thus, investigation by a civil rights lawyer of a claim of dis-
crimination which only involved looking into the case for the
client talking to potential witnesses, and determining whether
there were grounds for a suit would be immune. Whether this
exception can also be extended to investigations after the case
has been taken is more in doubt. However it could be argued
that investigation of facts or law at any time is not practicing
law. If a lawyer can hire a layman private detective to investi-
gate facts or use non-lawyers to research the law in his office
why should an out-of-state lawyer not be able to perform the
same functions?
There have been cases where southern sheriffs and police
refused to permit out-of-state lawyers to perform preliminary
acts of investigation, such as interviewing clients in the jail
viewing official records, and finding out information. 120 Some
of these incidents were part of the general harassment tactics
which southern law enforcement officials developed in response
to the 1963-65 demonstrations but such tactics have continued
in some areas. Certain courts have also used this tactic to
limit the effectiveness of out-of-state lawyers, such as an order
given by Judge Cox that his clerks would not accept any pleadings
or legal papers from someone who is not a member of the state
119
Meunier v. Bernich, 170 So. 567 (La. App. 1936)
(dictum).
1 2 0 Se__e Southern Justice (L. Friedman, ed. 1965).
bar12 1 'despite the fact that it is common practice for lawyers
to use secretaries and other non-lawyers to file papers at court
for them. However even though only Louisiana has judicially
recognized the "mere investigation" rule it is likely that most
courts would honor the exception.
D. Right to Appear Pro Se
Most states provide either by statute 1 2 2 or by judicial
recognition of a right in common law that a citizen may repre-
sent himself in any court action in which he is a party. 123 This
doctrine has not been extended, however, to permit a party to
be represented by a layman who is willing to assist him free of
charge. In Hackin v. Arizona, 124 the Supreme Court refused
to grant certiorari to review the conviction of a law school gradu-
ate who was not a member of a bar for unauthorized practice of
law in representing free of charge an indigent defendant who had
not been able to obtain a lawyer in an extradition hearing. Jus-
tice Douglas, dissenting, based his objections not on the right
to appear pro se but on the indigent's first amendment rights of
advocacy and petition of redress and of equal justice. 125 There
is no precedent for extending the right to appear pro se, and the
constitutional arguments for permitting non-members of the bar
to represent an indigent appear to provide stronger grounds,
but it may be that some state courts could be persuaded to
expand the doctrine. The right of an individual to defend him-
self, even without any knowledge of the law, court procedures,
and the ethical requirements of the bar is in itself in conflict
with the state's purpose in permitting only authorized lawyers
to practice. Such defense seems to be permitted because the
common law placed great importance on the right of the individual
free man to act for himself. Even in today's more complex
society, which requires more specialized legal representation,
1 2 1 Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 8 n. 12, Anderson v.
Cox, No. 25815 (5th Cir. 1968). See Judge Cox's reply in
Response and Certificate of United States District Judge at 6,
Anderson v. Cox id.
122E. g., S. C, Cod § 56-102 (1962).
123See Arthaud v. Griffin, 202 Iowa 462, 464, 210 N. W.
540, 541 (1926).
124389 U.S. 143 (1967).
125
Id. at 152.
there would still seem to be a valid policy reason for the indi-
vidual to be able to present his own case. If an indigent Negro
cannot obtain an authorized attorney and our courts do not
require that he be provided counsel in misdemeanor criminal
cases and all civil cases an essential extention of the right to
appear pro se may be to permit non-lawyer representation. The
arguments are more persuasive when made in a constitutional
context, but there may be room for an argument based on the
modern day application of the common law right which would
permit indigents to be represented in both civil and criminal
suits by non-bar members standing in the place of the individual
under his right to appear pro se.
E. "Solitary Incident" and "Practicality of One Lawyer" Rule
A number of courts have evolved a rule to temper the
harshness of unauthorized-practice statutes which permit an
out-of-state attorney to practice within the state in one particu-
lar case. The New York courts adopted the original "solitary
incident" doctrine whereby non-lawyers were held not to be
engaged in the practice of law by performing legal services as
a "single isolated incident" despite the fact that a fee was
charged. 126 In Bennett v. Goldsmith1 27 a layman who special-
ized in assisting clients to obtain visas to Canada was held not
to have practiced law by charging a small fee for the drawing of
a single legal document, and in People v. Title Guaranty and
Trust Company_ 128 a layman who drew a single legal document
for a fee was held not to have engaged in the practice of law.
However, in People v. Alfani, 1 2S a layman who made a regular
business of drawing up legal documents was held to be engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law.
The "solitary incident" rule by itself has limited value to
civil rights practice. It may be of some service in the occasional
situation in which an out-of-state attorney, such as a law pro-
fessor or attorney who is an expert in constitutional law, is
brought into a state to assist with a particular case. Affirma-
tive suits do sometimes require such expert assistance and if
1 2 6 See discussion in Note The Practice of Law by Out-
of-State Attorneys supra note 22, at 1303-04.
127280 N. Y. 529, 19 N. E. 2d 927 (1939).
128227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919).
129227 N.Y. 334 125 N.E. 671 (1919).
-i00-
it is feared that this will constitute unauthorized practice, the
"solitary incident" rule might be used as additional justification.
The "solitary incident" rule is of more value in those
states where it has developed into a broader doctrine permitting
an out-of-state attorney to perform substantial legal services.
Such an expansion usually requires that the services arise out
of legitimate representation of his client in the state in which he
practiced and be deemed necessary for the proper, efficient
and economical representation of that client. The 1964 New
Jersey Supreme Court decision of Appell v. Reiner 1 3 0 broke
the ground for the new extension of the doctrine. There a New
York attorney not admitted to the New Jersey bar was represent-
ing two New Jersey residents in the contest of a will in New
York. The will contest became dependent upon the settling of
certain claims against his clients by New Jersey creditors and
the attorney assisted in obtaining extension of credit and com-
promising the debts with the New Jersey creditors. In a suit
to recover his fee his clients raised the defense that he had
violated the New Jersey unauthorized-practice-of-law statute.
The court found that the clients' New Jersey financial
problems "constituted an inseparable unit" with the New York
will contest and held that due to the "inseparability" and "inter-
state nature" of the transactions his performance of legal ser-
vices in New Jersey was not against public policy and so not
illegal. 131 This doctrine, as so stated holds little promise for
civil rights practice which rarely involves this type of interstate
transaction. However the reasoning of the court indicates that
the doctrine may have a broader application. The court was
impressed by the fact that if the clients had been forced to retain
a separate New Jersey lawyer, the aggregate fees would have
exceeded the reasonable compensation for one attorney and the
involvement of two attorneys from different states would have
been "grossly impractical and inefficient. "132 These problems
are particularly present in civil rights cases. If a client should
not be required to hire a second lawyer to handle New Jersey
legal matters which are related to a New York action because of
the expense, inefficiency, and impracticality involved, a Negro
resident of Mississippi with a civil rights problem has similar
interests at stake. It is likely that the civil rights legal
13043 N.J. 313 204 A. 2d 146 (1964).
131
Id. at 314 204 A. 2d at 148.
132
Id. at 317, 204 A. 2d at 148.
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organizations offer the only legal representation he will be able
to obtain. The few attorneys who are licensed to practice in the
state and who will take civil rights cases are so overburdened
with non-fee civil rights cases and often lack the expertise to
handle the constitutional issues adequately that if the Negro is
forced to accept such representation, his case will suffer. If
there are valid policy reasons for not applying a state's
unauthorized practice laws because they will cause too much
expense and inefficiency in the handling of a client's case, then
there would seem to be equally compelling policy reasons for not
applying such laws where a Negro might thereby be denied effec-
tive representation.
It must be admitted that this analysis goes beyond both
the holding and dicta of the Appell case. Appell relates to the
particular problem of clients whose legal problems have multi-
state contacts while the typical civil rights case relates to only
one state. Also the legal services provided in Appell did not
involve participation in court proceedings, and the court specifi-
cally limited its holding to legal advice not related to court pro-
ceedings. But despite the factual differences it is suggested
that the policies involved have some common ground. The
Appell court was concerned with seeing that its citizens obtain
adequate legal services without undue expense or inefficiency.
If state unauthorized practice laws got in the way, it was willing
to waive them. The court recognized that a state's interests in
protecting its citizens from unauthorized practice of law may be
outweighed by the interest shared not only by the client, but also
the legal profession and the courts, in insuring that citizens
obtain adequate legal representation. There appears to be no
policy reason why a citizen with legal problems relating to two
states should be entitled to avoid unauthorized-practice laws to
obtain economical and efficient specialized legal representation
while a citizen with only an intrastate legal problem is not. The
Appell court it is true was particularly concerned with the
inefficiency caused in multi-state legal problems, but its ration-
ale indicates a concern for providing adequate legal representa-
tion for its citizens.
The Appell approach is relatively novel, but the ever-
increasing amount of multi-state legal problems indicates that
other jurisdictions may be attracted by it. The New York Court
of Appeals in its 1965 Spivak v. Sachs 1 3 3 decision chose not
to expand its "solitary incident" rule to include substantial legal
services and held that legal advice given over a two-week period
13316 N. Y. 2d 163, 211 N. E. 2d 329 (1965).
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by a California lawyer in New York constituted the unauthorized
practice of law. However in dicta the court expressed its
agreement with Appell that recognition must be given to the
problems caused by multi-state transactions and stated that "we
cannot penalize every instance in which an attorney. . comes
into our state for conferences or negotiations relating to a New
York client and a transaction somehow tied to New York. "134
Justification for the right to hire an out-of-state attorney
in non-fee civil rights cases in order to obtain adequate legal
representation may be better accomplished under a constitu-
tional analysis than by expanding the exceptions to unauthorized-
practice statutes. However in light of the limited holdings in
Sobol and Sanders there may be a need to rely upon more narrow
statutory construction arguments. Since in civil rights cases
the federal courts have been specifically directed by Congress
"to use that combination of federal law, common law, and state
law as will be 'best adapted to the object' of civil rights law, "135
the expansion of state doctrines regarding practice of law may
have an important role in accomplishing that result.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE
POWER TO REGULATE THE PRACTICE OF LAW
Apart from common law, statutory and judicial limita-
tions upon the state's power to regulate the practice of law there
are federal constitutional limitations which affect the power of
state legislatures and courts over the practice of law. These
restrictions may forbid state regulatory action altogether in
certain areas or merely limit unreasonable restrictions.
A. Supremacy Clause and Federal Preemption of Admission
Standards
Congress possesses the power to create standards for
the practice of law before federal agencies and to preempt the
right of a state to establish conflicting standards. The Supreme
Court held in 1963 in Sperry v. Florida 13 6 that although a state
has a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law,
Florida could not deny the right of a layman who had been
1 3 4 Id. at 168, 211 N. E. 2d at 331.
135Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F. 2d 280, 284 (5th
Cir. 1964).
136373 U.S. 379 (1963).
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admitted to practice before the U. S. Patent Office to perform
legal functions relating to the preparation and prosecution of
patent applications. The court relied upon the fact that Congress
expressly gave the Commissioner of Patents authority to make
regulations governing patent practice 1 3 7 and that under the
supremacy clause of Art. VI, Cl. 2 of the Constitution a state
could not pass a law in conflict with such regulations. The
court also determined that such exclusive jurisdiction of prac-
tice standards did not violate the tenth amendment. States still
possess, however, the right to regulate the practice of la ; the
decision did "not authorize the general practice of law"IS but
only those functions necessary to practice before the Patent
Office.
A number of other federal administrative agencies,
created by Congress and authorized to establish regulations
governing practice before them, have been held not to be subject
to state practice of law rules. The preemptive doctrine has been
applied to the NLRB 139 the ICC. 140 the Immigration Depart-
ment 141 the U. S. Land Office 42 U. S. Customs courts, 143
and the U. S. Tax Court. 144 The doctrine has not been extended
to authorize the general practice of law, even though relating to
the law of the particular federal agency. Thus, the New York
Court of Appeals in In re Bercu1 4 5 held that a certified public
13735 U, S C § 31.
138 373 U.S. 379, 386 (1963).
13 9 Auerbacher v. Wood, 139 N. J. Eq. 599, 604 53 A. 2d
800, 803 (1947), aff '. 142 N. J. Eq. 484, 59 A. 2d 863 (1948).
14 0 DePass v. B. Harris Wool Co., 346 Mo. 1038, 144
S. W. 2d 146 (1940).
141Bennett v. Goldsmith 280 N. Y. 529, 19 N. E. 2d 927
(1939).
142In re Gibbs 35 Ariz. 346, 355, 278 P. 371, 374 (1929)
(dictum); Mulligan v. Smith 32 Colo. 404, 76 P. 1063 (1904).
143 Brooks v. Mandel-Witte Co., 54 F. 2d 992 (2d Cir.
1932), cert. denied, 286 U. S. 559 (1932).
1 4 4 Petition of Kearney, 63 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1953).
145 299 N. Y. 728, 87 N. E. 2d 451 (1949).
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accountant was not entitled to give legal advice concerning federal
tax matters and that in so doing he had violated the state's
unauthorized practice of law statute.
The essential element in the application of the preemp-
tive doctrine appears to be that Congress or a federal agency
acting under congressional authorization has established definite
standards for admission to practice. Classic examples are the
U. S. Patent Office which admits laymen as patent attorneys and
the U. S. Customs Court which admits laymen as customs
brokers. A number of federal agencies do not establish express
standards for admission to practice before them, but, like the
ICC and the NLRB permit a party or a layman representative
to appear before them. 146 Finally, a number of federal agen-
cies do not specifically provide for appearances before them,
but a federal act provides that certain complaints will be
received by the agency and that certain actions will be taken by
the agency in regard to the complaints. 147 The question then
arises as to whether such federal legislation is preemptive of
state unauthorized-practice statutes which would forbid a person
who is not a member of the local bar from engaging in such prac-
tice.
This question is particularly applicable to civil rights
practice which frequently involves dealings with federal agencies
which do not have express standards for practice before them.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 empowers federal agencies and
commissionsi to make various kinds of legal determinations upon
complaint. Title II of the Act provides that civil actions for dis-
crimination in public accommodations may be referred by the
court for 60 days to a newly created agency called the Community
Relations Service which has investigatory powers and that injunc-
tive and civil actions may be brought by the Attorney General if
he deems it necessary upon the basis of complaints received. 148
Title IV provides for a survey and establishment of guidelines
for grants by the Commissioner of Education and for suits (upon
receipt of a written complaint) by the Attorney General to accom-
plish desegregation of public education. 149 Title V gives
1 4 6 See notes 139 and 140 supra.
147E.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42
U S. C. § 1971 (1964).
14842 U. S. C. §§ 2000a-3(d), 2000a-5(a).
14942 U S. C. §§ 2000c-1 2000c-4(a), 2000c-6(a).
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investigatory powers to the Commission on Civil Rights in cases
involving deprivation of the right to vote. 150 Title VI provides
for determinations of charges of discrimination in federally
assisted programs, from a hearing examiner to final determina-
tion by the Commissioner of Welfare. 151 Title VII empowers
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to investigate
and bring charges in the federal courts on complaints of dis-
criminatory employment practices. 152 It should be obvious that
a layman is usually incapable of pursuing his various rights
under this act without some form of assistance in dealing with
the governmental agencies and authorities involved. The fact
that no express provision is made in the Act as to the type of
person who can represent an aggrieved party in dealings with
the government authorities would under a strict application of
the preemption doctrine permit a state to forbid the giving of
legal assistance by one not admitted to the state bar.
The reason usually given for applying the preemption
doctrine to legal practice before federal agencies is that such
agencies must not be hampered in the prosecution of their func-
tions (and thus the purpose of the federal legislation frustrated)
by undue state regulation. With this interest in mind there
appears to be no valid reason for a distinction permitting prac-
tice in violation of state unauthorized-practice laws before the
FCC and NLRB because they expressly permit one to appear
through a "representative" and forbidding similar legal services
in filing a complaint under the Civil Rights Act. Both situations
involve practice before a particular federal agency, based upon
a specialized body of federal law, and in both the scope of the
legal services to be performed can be easily limited beforehand.
If the preemption doctrine were extended to prevent state
unauthorized-practice rules from applying to all legal services
incident to federal administrative practice, a good portion of
civil rights practice would thereby be protected. Obviously
federal administrative practice should not be opened up to any-
one without any requirement of admission standards. However,
there seems to be no reason why the state laws could not be held
to be preempted in those cases in which a practitioner possesses
professional qualifications, such as membership in the bar of
another state (whether non-lawyers who possess expertise in a
15042 U. S. C § 1975(a).
151
42 U S C. § 2000d-l.
152
42 U. S, §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5.
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particular administrative field should be permitted to practice
before federal agencies in non-fee civil rights cases is beyond
the scope of this article) and in those cases in which there is a
showing that no fee is being charged and the client was unable to
obtain adequate representation by a member of the local bar.
This approach would protect the federal interest of insuring that
the objectives of its legislation are carried out and that its citi-
zens have access to its administrative tribunals without interfer-
ing with the state in protecting its citizens from unqualified and
unethical law practitioners.
B. State Interests in the Regulation of Admission to Practice
The Supreme Court stated in Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners: 153
A state can require high standards of qualification, such
as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before
it admits an applicant to the bar but any qualification
must have a rational connection with the applicant's fit-
ness or capacity to practice law . .. Obviously an
applicant could not be excluded merely because he was
a Republican or a Negro or a member of a particular
church. Even in applying permissible standards offi-
cers of a State cannot exclude an applicant when there is
no basis for their finding that he fails to meet these
standards or when their action is invidiously discrimina-
tory.
State admission-to-practice rules, therefore, must have some
reasonable relation to the protection of valid state interests.
The state interest in regulating the practice of law is based upon
its desire to insure that its citizens courts and institutions
will be served by attorneys who:
1) Possess adequate knowledge of the state and federal
law and the procedures applicable in its courts to be
able to provide competent legal advice and representa-
tion
2) Possess qualities of good moral character necessary
for professional men and officers of the court
3) Are easily available and amenable to process incident
to any case in which they represent a party and can
153353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
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be held accountable for any mistake, malfeasance or
breach of conduct resulting from their legal practice.
The first of these interests is met by the requirement
that before a person is eligible to take the state bar examination
he must be a graduate of an accredited law school, have taken a
certain number of legal courses or have completed a satisfac-
tory course of study with a lawyer 1 5 4 and the requirement that
he must satisfactorily pass the state bar examination. 155 The
second is met by the requirement that an applicant for bar
admission must submit character references, possibly be
examined by a committee of the bar and be determined to
meet certain character requirements. 156 The third is met by
requirements that an attorney must be a resident of the state
and, in some states, that he be a resident of the local community
and that he be subject to the rules of ethics promulgated by the
state bar on pain of disbarment for failure to comply. 157
When these state interests are applied to out-of-state
civil rights lawyers, the case for state regulation is not over-
whelming. It is difficult to make a strong argument that out-of-
state civil rights attorneys threaten either of the first two state
interests. They all have graduated from accredited law schools
(and a high proportion of them come from respected law
schools 1 8 and were graduated high in their class1 5 9 ) and have
15 4 For discussion of the requirements of the various
states as to the numbers of years of law school or law study
required for eligibility to take the bar exam see Countryman
The Lawyer in Modern Society, Parts IV, VII-2 to-7 (1965).
155E. g., Ala. Code tit. 46, § 27(1) (1958) (examination
requirements).
156 E.g., Ala. Code tit. 46, § 25(c) (1958) (investigation
requirements).
157E.g., Ala. Code tit. 46 §§ 49, 50 (1958) (grounds for
disbarment).
158For example, a large proportion of the twenty-eight
Inc. Fund staff attorneys graduated from Harvard, Yale, and
Columbia Law Schools. Interview with Melvin Zarr, Legal
Defense Fund, Inc. Staff Attorney, New York City, N. Y.
159See £a.g Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 6,
Anderson v. Cox, No. 25815 (5th Cir. 1968): "Paul Brest is a
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passed a bar examination in their state. Some of the civil
rights lawyers have been national experts in their field like
Anthony Amsterdam and the late Mark De Wolfe Howe, and
some are acknowledged experts with substantial practical experi-
ence in civil rights work. like Alvin Bronstein and Richard Sobol
of the LCDC. Many are relatively young, recent law school
graduates but very few, these days, are without practical
experience and specialized training in civil rights and federal
law. All three of the civil rights legal organizations operating
in the South provide workshops for both their volunteers and their
staff attorneys. 160 The knowledge of federal law and procedures
of all civil rights attorneys is generally in excess of that of the
average local southern lawyer. The record of the hearings
before the three-judge court in the Sobol case shows instances
when Sobol! on cross-examination by the southern lawyers on
the other side, displayed a more thorough knowledge of both
federal and Louisiana law than did his cross-examiners. 161
The interest of the state in insuring that attorneys
possess good moral character also provides little support for
the exclusion of out-of-state civil rights lawyers. These lawyers
have passed the character examinations required by their states,
and there has never been any contention that character require-
ments are more rigorous or exacting in southern states than
elsewhere. In order for the state to substantiate its interest
graduate magna cum laude of Harvard Law School and has
served as a law clerk to a United States Circuit Judge;" and
Brief for Plaintiffs at 32-33, Sobol v. Perez, No. 67-243 (E. D.
La., July 22, 1968): "Mr. Sobol is an honor graduate of the
Columbia Law School in New York City. As an officer of the
Columbia Law Review, he did considerable specialized study in
the fields of constitutional and criminal law; and, while a stu-
dent, he was a research assistant to Professor Herbert
Wechsler in the Professor's work as Reporter for the Model
Penal Code. Upon graduation, he worked briefly for a New York
law firm and then served as a law clerk to a United States Cir-
cuit Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. He
thereafter moved to Washington, D. C., where he was Special
Assistant to a F. T. C. Commissioner before joining the Washing-
ton law firm of Arnold and Porter. "
160E.., Amended Complaint at 4, Sobol v. Perez, No.
67-243 (E.D. La., July 22, 1968).
161 See newspaper account in The Times-Picayune, New
Orleans, La., Jan. 31, 1968, at 1.
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it would have to attack the generally accepted notion of "comity"
which all southern states have adopted in some form. That is
if a sourthern state is willing to grant pro hac vice admission
to any out-of-state attorney who comes from a state which will
extend the same privilege to its attorneys, it appears that it is
not particularly concerned with checking the intellectual creden-
tials and character of all out-of-state attorneys. In fact even
the strongest advocates of excluding out-of-state civil rights
attorneys, like Judge Cox and Judge Leon of Pacquemines
Parish (in the Sobol case), have not pressed the argument that
they could not trust the bar examination and character deter-
minations of other states. The published standards of the
American Bar Association 1 6 2 have tended to bring all state
admission requirements up to minimum standards (the southern
states, particularly Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisi-
ana, have always been the problem states with lower standards
than those of other states). 163 The general attitude of most bar
associations including the southern ones favoring extending
professional courtesies to members of other bars and the possi-
ble effect of the "full faith and credit clause" on attacks by one
state upon the sufficiency of determinations of qualifications to
practicel 6 4 have tended to make southerners avoid the argument
1 6 2ABA Section of Legal Education and Admission to the
Bar.
163
The southern states are among the least demanding
states as regards required period of prelegal education (Missis-
sippi--2 years college or 4 years high school; Georgia--high
school or equivalent), required period of law study (Georgia--2
years) and alternatives to law school study (Georgia and Missis-
sippi--2 years law office study; Louisiana--combination office
and school study equivalent to 3 years full-time law school study;
North Carolina South Carolina, Texas and Virginia--3 years law
office study or 3 years in office and school). Countryman The
Lawyer in Modern Society, supra note 154, at VII-3 to -6, com-
piled from ABA Section of Legal Education and Admission to the
Bar, 1960 Review of Legal Education, 23-28 (1960).
1 6 4 The full faith and credit clause U. S. Const. art. IV
S1, has not been applied to the right of an out-of-state attorney
to practice. Licensing may be a special public act not within
full faith and credit clause protection, and the right to practice a
profession in one state has been held not to extend such right in
another state. See Rhode Island v. Rosenkrans, 30 R. I. 374 75
A. 491 (1910), aff'd 225 U.S. 698 (1912) (dentistry). A further
full faith and credit argument has been suggested: "A second
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that they cannot trust the bar examinations and character deter-
minations of other states.
An argument which is more frequently made is that out-
of-state civil rights attorneys are not familiar with the local
rules and procedures. In some cases that has only meant that
they questioned segregated court rooms, 165 raised objections to
all-white juries which are never raised by local attorneys, 166
and objected to the constitutionality of practices which have
always been accepted. 167 However, there is some justification
use of full faith and credit might be more fruitful, By this reason-
ing, where full faith and credit provides a client with an absolute
right to proceed in state litigation, and that right would be denied
if he were not represented by foreign counsel, a right of admis-
sion passes to the foreign counsel selected. Denial of admission
of the foreign attorney would thus be considered an effective
denial of full faith and credit. " Note, The Practice of Law by
Out-of-State Attorneys, supra note 57, at 1291.
16516See Schulman "Clarksdale Customs " in Southern
Justice 111 (L. Friedman ed. 1965), "The Supreme Court decided
not long ago that the Constitution requires integration of all
courtrooms--state and Federal--and the conviction of a Negro
in a segregated court must be reversed. Yet when a Mississippi
judge, a woman, ordered her courtroom segregated and was told
what the Supreme Court had decided she smiled benignly and
said: yes, she knew of that decision 'but we have our customs
down here. I The courtroom remained segregated. "
1 6 6 Carruthers v. Reed, 102 F. 2d 933 (8th Cir. 1939)
(failure of attorney for Negro to object to exclusion of Negroes
from jury because he believed it would lead to an increase of
race prejudice in the community held not violative of due process
and equal protection); Smith v. Balkcom, 205 Ga. 408 54 S.E.
2d 272 (1949) (failure of attorney to object to exclusion of
Negroes from jury panel held not denial of adequate counsel as
attorney had been member of the bar for 25 years); McNeil v.
North Carolina 248 F. Supp. 867 (E. D. N.C. 1965) (failure of
attorney to challenge all white jury panel held chargeable to
defendant).
167Lucear v. Georgia 221 Ga. 572 146 S.E 2d 316
(1965) (reference to defense witnesses as "tiggers" by prose-
cutor held not grounds for reversing murder conviction); Swain
v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (1965) (participation by defense
attorneys with prosecutor in striking Negroes under "struck
-111-
for the complaint that out-of-state attorneys are not familiar
with lawful local practices, and to some extent, this has prob-
ably caused some delay and inconvenience in legal matters in
which out-of-state civil rights attorneys have been involved.
However, there is the same problem with out-of-state attorneys
who are admitted pro hac vice on "comity" rules; this is one of
the drawbacks of all law cases involving interstate matters. One
of the interesting aspects of the Cox and Russell rule is that
while it has been applied to prevent civil rights lawyers from
obtaining admission to the court, the time-consuming and harass-
ing tactics of the Attorneys' Committee have not been applied to
lawyers from neighboring states. Judge Cox testified at the
hearing on the Petition for Mandamus concerning the admission
after the rule was promulgated, of attorneys from neighboring
states: 
1 6 8
I admit them all the time on the Coast. They come over
here in droves from Alabama and New Orleans on the
other side and I haven't referred those matters to the
Committee even because they just as a matter of course
are admitted if they are in good standing and have been
practicing for five years.
This kind of double standard raises doubts about the arguments
for state interest in this type of exclusion of attorneys. 169
The third state interest, that of insuring that an attorney
jury" system); Bowen v. U. S., 192 F. 2d 515 (5th Cir. 1951)
(Failure to object to pretrial statement); Jones v. Huff 80 App.
D. C. 254, 152 F. 2d 14 (1945) (failure to raise constitutional
issues).
168
Brief for Petitioners at 6, Anderson v. Cox, No.
25815 (5th Cir. 1968).
169
Judge Cox's rule, of course constitutes action by a
federal court, rather than a state, but the interest of a federal
court in preventing out-of-state attorneys from practice is simi-
lar to the interests of states in enforcing unauthorized practice
laws. Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg, 333 F. 2d 280, 285 (5th
Cir. 1964), said of Judge Cox's refusal to accept removal peti-
tions signed by out-of-state attorneys: "This principle [that a
state's power to regulate the practice of law cannot infringe
upon the right to representation I applies with special force
where it is a federal court and not a state, whose regulations
may interfere with lawsuits authorized by Congress. "
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is amenable to process, is not threatened in the civil rights con-
text. All three of the civil rights legal organizations are non-
profit corporations and have complied with the requirements for
doing business in the southern states in which they operate. All
three have permanent offices there and all pleadings can be
served on their attorneys at that office. They also have a
national office with full-time staff. There has never been any
complaint that mail has not been answered promptly. 170 There
have been a few complaints by southern courts that civil rights
attorneys missed scheduled appointments and dropped suits 171
but this has been rare particularly since the organizations have
begun to rely almost entirely upon staff attorneys rather than
volunteers.
Judge Cox actually has not maintained that civil rights
attorneys have been unamenable to process. In his brief he
gives the following reason for his rule: 17 2
The comity rule became important and necessary by
reason of the large number of transient attorneys from
other states who moved to Jackson and boldly practiced
law in damage suits and labor relations cases without
qualifying to practice law in this state or before the trial
17 0 One of the reasons given by the State of Kansas for
not permitting Kansas attorneys who lived and practiced outside
the state to practice in Kansas was that there had been problems
in getting such lawyers to attend dockets answer their phone
and be available for service. The Supreme Court apparently
found this persuasive in upholding the state regulation. Martin
v. Walton, 368 U. S. 25 (1961).
17 1 See Response and Certificate of United States Dis-
trict Judge at 8 Anderson v. Cox, No. 25815 (5th Cir. 1968):
"An accumulation of brazen acts of people from other states
claiming to be lawyers and actually practicing law in a case in
this Court against International Paper Company and several labor
unions precipitated the adoption of this comity rule. Those per-
sons [including Mrs. Brest] were taking depositions in the
Southern Division of this district and abruptly abandoned a noticed
hearing with their clients resulting in a hearing before this
Court resulting in the imposition of sanctions against their
clients under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
172
Response and Certificate of United States District
Judge at 6, Anderson v. Cox, No. 25815 (5th Cir. 1968).
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court. Many of these persons were mere law students on
vacation at the time. Some of these students even improp-
erly and erroneously advised people charged with crimes
in the trial court.
It is obvious that the state (and in the Cox situation a particular
federal court) has a genuine interest in insuring that fly-by-night
attorneys do not create expectations in clients and those dealing
with them and then leave the state free from accountability for
unethical practices. However, this is not the case with the
civil rights attorneys. The resident staff attorneys have for the
most part spent at least one year or more in the state, and the
non-resident staff attorneys and volunteer attorneys who come
in from out-of-state are screened beforehand by the organiza-
tions, with the organizations standing behind any legal actions
undertaken by them. The requirement for association of a local
attorney has been the primary method of insuring that an out-
of-state lawyer will have an office to work out of while in the
state where process can be served. The permanent civil rights
organization office in the state serves this purpose for civil
rights attorneys.
VII. FEDERAL INTERESTS IN PROTECTION
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
The federal interest in the regulation of the right to prac-
tice law extends not only to its administrative agencies, as dis-
cussed previously, but also to the responsibility of the federal
courts to protect the constitutional rights of citizens.
A. Right to Representation by Counsel of Own Choice
The Constitution guarantees a right to appointed counsel
to indigents in a variety of situations. Gideon v. Wainwright 17 3
held that the sixth amendment right to counsel as applied to the
states by the fourteenth amendment due process clause requires
that an indigent be provided legal counsel in the trial of a felony
case. That right has been extended by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals 1 7 4 and certain jurisdictions 1 7 5 to include serious
misdemeanor cases. The right of an indigent to appointed
173372 U.S. 335 (1963).
174Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965);
McDonald v. Moore, 353 F. 2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
175E. g., State v. Borst, 154 N. W. 2d 888 (Minn. 1967).
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counsel was extended in Douglas v. California 1 7 6 to include the
appeal and in a number of other cases to include pre-trial pro-
ceedings. 177 Griffin v. Illinois, 178 established the proposition
that when certain procedural rights which are not constitutionally
required, are made available by a state, those rights cannot be
denied an indigent. Griffin may provide support for the conten-
tion that an indigent cannot be denied free counsel when others
with funds are permitted to have counsel.
The right of an indigent to free counsel has not been
extended to civil cases. However there is sentiment among
what appears to be a minority of the Supreme Court Justices for
review of the civil counsel situation. Justice Fortas stated in a
national television broadcast on October 27, 1967 ti.at:
1 7 9
Gideon established that persons who commit felonies are
entitled to lawyers if they cannot afford to hire one them-
selves. The next question and the great question before
the country now in connection with the urban problem is
whether the state will provide lawyers at state expense
to poor people who cannot afford to hire lawyers when
such poor people are involved in some civil litigation
... . The only way to provide equal justice is to pro-
vide counsel for persons who have legal problems and
the only way that can be done adequately is through state
support.
Justice Douglas has maintained in Williams v. Shaffer 1 8 0 and
Hackin v. Arizona 1 81 that the fourteenth amendment ensures
equal justice for the poor in both criminal and civil actions. In
Williams v. Shaffer, an action involving eviction of a poor tenant
176372 U.S. 353 (1963).
177
See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400 (1965) (right to
confrontation); White v. Maryland 373 U. S. 59 (1963) (prelimin-
ary hearing); Hamilton v. Alabama 368 U. S. 52 (1961) (arraign-
ment).
178
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
179 Quoted from transcript of "Justice for All, " National
Broadcasting Company, Oct. 27, 1967.
180
385 U.S. 1037 (1967).
181
389 U.S. 143 (1967).
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by a landlord under the Georgia summary eviction statute, he
stated: 1 8 2
We have recognized that the promise of equal justice for
all would be an empty phrase for the poor if the ability
to obtain judicial relief were made to turn on the length
of a person's purse. It is true that these cases have
dealt with criminal proceedings. But the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited
to criminal prosecutions. Its protections extend as well
to civil matters. I can see no more justification for
denying an indigent a hearing in an eviction proceeding
solely because of his poverty than for denying an indi-
gent the right to appeal (Burns v. Ohio [360 U.S. 252,
79 S. Ct. 1164, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1209]), the right to file a
habeas corpus petition (Smith v. Bennett [365 U. S. 708,
81 S. Ct. 895, 6 L. Ed. 2d 39]), or the right to obtain a
transcript necessary for appeal (Griffin v. People of
State of Illinois, [351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585, 100 L.
Ed. 891]).
The right of an indigent to free counsel is important in
the civil rights and poverty law areas, because the lawyers pro-
vided by these organizations are frequently the only lawyers
available to Negroes and the poor for legal assistance. There
is, therefore, a constitutional cast to the activities of such law
practice which is derivative from the right of the individual him-
self to free counsel. However, since the criminal portion of
civil rights practice has been steadily decreasing and most
poverty law programs do not take criminal cases, and since the
right to counsel has not been extended to civil cases the indi-
gent's right to counsel cannot be relied upon.
In addition to the right of indigents to free counsel there
is a general right of a citizen to be represented in any case by
counsel of his choice. The Supreme Court stated in Powell v.
Alabama: 1 8 3
If in any case civil or criminal a state or federal
court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by
counsel, employed by and appearing for him it reason-
ably may not be doubted that such a refusal would be a
denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in
the constitutional sense.
182385 U.S. 1037, 1039-40 (1967).
183287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
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This principle has been upheld in both state and federal court
contexts by subsequent cases. 184
This right has been found to override both state unauthor-
ized-practice-of-law statutes and restrictive pro hac vice admis-
sions. In Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corporation, 185 a case
involving legal services by an out-of-state anti-trust specialist,
the Second Circuit affirmed that there is a right to obtain
specialized legal services and that a citizen with a federal
claim or defense cannot be prevented by state unauthorized-
practice-of-law statutes from engaging an out-of-state lawyer
so long as a local lawyer is associated. Spanos specifically
involved a citizen with a federal claim or defense and because
its holding was based upon the privileges and immunities clause
of the fourteenth amendment (as will be discussed shortly), it
does not stand for the proposition that state unauthorized-prac-
tice rules cannot prevent a citizen with a state law problem from
obtaining out-of-state counsel. However, the general right of a
citizen to counsel of his choice is well established and although
the federal nature of a suit adds an additional constitutional
dimension in support of overriding state restrictive rules, the
right to counsel is equally at stake in a purely state law matter.
The need for representation by counsel having both specialized
knowledge and vigorous interest in the case can be just as
great in a case involving state law as one involving federal law.
The civil rights claimant, however, will usually have a claim
based on federal law.
The courts have also upheld the right to be represented
by an out-of-state counsel in the face of restrictive pro hac vice
rules. In United States v. Bergamo 1 8 6 a federal district judge
in the Middle District of Pennsylvania refused to admit a New
Jersey lawyer pro hac vice to defend a criminal case despite
the fact that he was a member in good standing in a New Jersey
federal court and had associated a local attorney. The Third
Circuit stated that "[t ]o hold that defendants in a criminal trial
may not be defended by out-of-the-district counsel selected by
184E.g., Reynolds v. Cochran, 365 U.S. 525, 530
(1961); Crooker v. California 357 U. S. 433, 439 (1958) (dictum);
Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U. S. 3, 9 (1954); Glasser v. U. S.,
315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
185 364 F. 2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 987
(1966).
186 154 F. 2d 31 (3d Cir. 1946).
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them is to vitiate the guarantee of the Sixth Amendment. ,,187
The court reserved the question whether this right applied to
civil cases, but it is suggested that the relatively new approach
represented by the Spanos case would provide an equally com-
pelling argument for overriding pro hac vice refusals of an out-
of-state attorney in a civil case. There has not been complete
agreement with the Bergamo result. A more recent federal
district court decision People of the State of New York v.
Epton 188 rejected a removal petition which alleged that the
state judge had refused to permit representation by an attorney
who was not a member of the New York bar and approved the
judge's statement that "counsel of his own choosing means
counsel recognized by the Courts of this State. "189 This deci-
sion, however, may be distinguished on its facts as there was
no showing that a local attorney was associated or that the out-
of-state attorney was necessary to provide specialized or
sympathetic representation which was unavailable by a local
New York City attorney.
In a number of ways, civil rights cases present a stronger
case for permitting representation by an out-of-state counsel
than does a case in which the client or defendant can afford and
obtain an acceptable local attorney. Civil rights lawyers are
often the only counsel the client can obtain. The Legal Defense
Fund, in its brief in Anderson v. Cox, argued that its lawyers
provided by local attorneys in filling a need for: 19 0
1) Specialized legal service - With the increasing com-
plexity of the legal profession, federal, and particu-
larly civil rights law, has become a specialized prac-
tice. Petitioners' attorneys are among the few
specialists in this field. Indeed, in the highly special-
ized area of school desegregation litigation in Missis-
sippi, petitioners' attorneys are the only nongovern-
mental attorneys operating in the field.
2) Free legal service - This service is not a commer-
cialization of the legal profession which might
187
Id. at 35.
188248 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
189Id. at 277.
190
Brief for Petitioners at 13-14, Anderson v. Cox, No.
25815 (5th Cir. 1968).
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threaten the moral and ethical fabric of the adminis-
tration of justice. It is not "ambulance chasing. "
3) Courageous legal service - It is not overstatement
that in Mississippi, and in the South generally, Ne-
groes with civil rights claims or defenses have often
found securing representation difficult . ... The
occasion when a locally admitted attorney not associ-
ated with the LDF LCCRUL or the LCDC undertakes
a civil rights case in Mississippi is a remarkable
event indeed.
191
Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg is a seminal case in
establishing a right in a civil rights context to representation by
an out-of-state lawyer in the face of a restrictive court rule,
although its holding is limited by its favorable fact situation. It
involved the arrest of forty civil rights demonstrators in the
summer of 1964 under recently enacted statutes forbidding
picketing and demonstrations in the environs of public buildings.
When they attempted to remove their cases to the U. S. District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the Clerk act-
ing under local court rules promulgated by Judge Cox, refused
to accept the petitions for filing on the grounds that: 1) they
were in behalf of more than one individual, 2) were not accom-
panied by a filing fee of $15 per individual 3) were not accom-
panied by a removal bond of $500 per individual, and 4) were
not signed by a member of the bar of the U. S. District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi.
The Fifth Circuit held that the first three requirements
would unduly restrict the federal objective of protecting civil
rights. It found the fourth requirement to be violative of the
rights to free expression and association by engaging in litiga-
tion (which will be discussed in the next section) and to counsel.
The court recognized that a federal district court has broad dis-
cretion over admission but stated:192
[I]f no local counsel are available, a court rule requir-
ing local counsel should be waived. Moreover where
local counsel are associated in the case to comply with
court rules, non-local counsel chosen by the parties may
nevertheless take the lead in the direction and argument
of the case. . ..
191 333 F. 2d 280 (5th Cir. 1964).
192
Id. at 285, 286.
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[W]aiver of local rules or admission to the
bar pro hac vice should be allowed when as herein
alleged, the non-local counsel "was unable to find coun-
sel admitted [locally] who would sign the pleadings with
him. "
Thus Lefton would hold state and court restrictive admission
rules to be inapplicable to out-of-state attorneys "if no local
counsel are available. " A threshold determination as to whether
local counsel is available must be made. Lefton involved a situ-
ation in which time was of the essence and refusals of representa-
tion by some members of the bar and general hostility by the
rest of the bar left little doubt that local counsel could not be
obtained. It may be more difficult, however, to prove that local
counsel is not available to defend Negroes in a civil-rights-
related case like the one involved in Sobol's arrest or in the
school desegregation suits filed by the out-of-state attorneys
in Judge Cox's court. There have been cases where every law-
yer in the locality was asked and refused to take a civil rights
case. 193 Should however an individual be expected to call
every member of the state bar and obtain a refusal before he
can be represented by an out-of-state civil rights lawyer? If
not should evidence indicating that some local lawyers were
asked and that they represent a cross-section of the bar be
required? In either case the requirement would constitute an
onerous burden on the defendant.
The right to counsel, when viewed apart from its rela-
tionship to first amendment rights, may be of limited value in
today's civil rights practice, because of the need to prove
unavailability of local counsel. However it may not be strain-
ing the rationale of the Lefton decision to say that what is re-
quired is that no local counsel be available for "adequate repre-
sentation. " It would then sometimes appear that a civil rights
litigant cannot obtain "adequate representation" from either the
few Negro or civil rights attorneys who are admitted to the bar
or from the entire white bar. The fact that the few Negro and
civil rights attorneys admitted to the local bar are unable to
handle all civil rights cases (and particularly complicated
affirmative suits)' 9 4 and that white members of the bar have
19 3 See Oppenheim "The Abdication of the Southern Bar,"
in Southern Justice, 127-35 (Friedman ed. 1965).
194C. B. King, a Negro attorney practicing in southwest
Georgia, was representing civil rights clients in more than
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demonstrated a lack of sympathy for civil rights suits 1 9 5 and an
unwillingness to raise constitutional issues and defenses in be-
half of Negro clients196 should be sufficient proof that adequate
representation is not available from local counsel.
As time goes on, the argument can be expected to be
made more often by southern lawyers that they will accept "genu-
ine" cases involving civil rights which are not just "propaganda"
and will provide adequate representation. 197 This argument
2, 000 pending cases in 1964 most of the cases not involving a
fee. Pollitt "Timid Lawyers and Neglected Clients, " Harper's,
Aug., 1964, 81 at 83. For statistics on the number of Negro
lawyers in southern states, see Carlin and Howard, Legal Repre-
sentation and Class Justice 12 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 381, 394
n. 41; The Negro Lawyer in Virginia: A Survey, 51 Va. L. Rev.
545, 553 n. 8. The Report of the Advisory Committee for the
Minority Groups Study, Association of American Law Schools
Proceedings, 1967 Annual Meeting, 160, reported: "The finding
is that the current output of Negro law graduates is painfully
inadequate; it is hardly more than miniscule. Negroes make up
one-tenth of the population, yet less than 200 are currently
graduating from American law schools as contrasted with some
10, 000 white graduates. "
195 See note 44 supra.
19 6 See notes 166 and 167 supra.
197 See Judge Cox's statement: "Of course all your
cases involve federal rights but I don't think it's an accurate
statement to intimate in this record that there are not local
Counsel that are available to handle any kind of civil rights
cases on either side. I have had that suggested and I pointed
out a law firm here some years ago in a case where that very
contention was made and they went to that law firm and hired
them immediately. And only two or three months ago, I had a
case that involved civil rights of the very worst kind. Matter of
fact it was a federal case against three colored boys for I
believe about one of the most inflammatory charges that could
be made against them, involved some white girls and I appointed
this very competent lawyer and he went right to bat for them and
I think he sought some legal assistance from maybe your crowd
[Legal Defense Fund] or Mr. Bronstein's crowd [Lawyers'
Constitutional Defense Committee ] and I saw his brief and he
wrote a real able brief. It's in the Fifth Circuit now. People
were tried before a mixed jury I think it had three colored
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tends to obscure the real issue in these cases which is that per-
sons being deprived of their constitutional rights are entitled
not merely to adequate assistance but to vigorous and effective
legal assistance in protecting those rights and that such protec-
tion extends beyond the limits of the constitutional right to
counsel.
B. Rights of Free Speech and Association by Engaging in Litiga-
tion
Civil rights legal organizations their attorneys, and
potential Negro litigants all share in the interest insured by the
first amendment in using litigation as a form of political expres-
sion directed at vindicating civil rights. The first amendment
is a broader and more potent limitation upon restrictive admis-
sion rules than the right to counsel which is tied to criminal
cases and requires proof of inadequacy and unavailability of
local counsel. The Supreme Court recognized in NAACP v.
Button that civil rights litigation is a "form of political expres-
sio 98
* . . [Ajbstract discussion is not the only species of
communication which the Constitution protects; the First
Amendment also protects vigorous advocacy, certainly
of lawful ends, against governmental intrusion ... In
the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a
t,.chnique of resolving private differences; it is a means
for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of treat-
ment for all government, federal, state and local for
the members of the Negro community in this country. It
is thus a form of political expression. Groups which
find themselves unable to achieve their objectives
through the ballot frequently turn to the courts. Just as
it was true of the opponents of the New Deal legislation
during the 1930's for example no less is it true of the
Negro minority today. And under the conditions of
modern government, litigation may well be the sole
practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for
redress of grievances.
people and nine white people on there and they were convicted
but this fellow had no hesitancy and he didn't even wince at all
at my asking him to handle the defense. " Brief for Petitioners
at 14, Anderson v. Cox, No. 25815 (5th Cir. 1968).
198371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963).
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The right to litigate necessarily includes a right to
counsel, 199 and this right to counsel, when viewed in the litiga-
tion context, would appear to be broader than the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. The generally accepted rule for deter-
mining whether the legal assistance provided met constitutional
standards of the sixth amendment and due process is whether it
was so deficient as "to shock the conscience of the court and
make the proceedings a farce and a mockery of justice. ,200
Courts have taken the attitude that one who accepts a lawyer is
estopped from denying that he had proper representation. 201
Thus, even those like Justice Douglas, who have urged the
recognition of a right to counsel in certain kinds of civil cases,
have not attempted to define what qualities are essential to the
requirement of "effective counsel. " Most of the cases dealing
with the issue arise out of later complaints that there was inade-
quate representation. The courts' narrow definition of what is
required reflect the fear that there will be no end to litigation
if parties can later object to the quality of their legal representa-
tion. A few cases have considered the problem in a different
context. Spanos v. Skouras Theatres Corporation 202 relying
on the privileges and immunities clause, found a right to be
represented by an out-of-state attorney with particular exper-203
tise in a specialized area of federal law, and Appell v. Reiner
mentioned considerations of practicality, efficiency, and cost
in weighing the effectiveness of local counsel against out-of-
state counsel. These cases are relevant in analyzing the first
amendment right to litigate by showing that even in a civil con-
text not involved with first amendment rights there are certain
minimal qualities inherent in the notion of "effective counsel.
"Effectiveness" is an important element of the first
199 371 U.S. 415, 428-30 (1963).
200 Smith v. United States, 324 F. 2d 436, 440 (D. C.
Cir. 1963); United States v. Miller, 254 F. 2d 523, 524 (2d Cir.
1958).
201
. Tompsett v. Ohio, 146 F. 2d 95 (6th Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 324 U. S. 869 (1945); Archer v. Clark 202 Ga. 229, 42
S. E. 2d 924 (1947); Azulay v. Warden 214 Md. 617, 135 A.2d
453 (1957), cert. denied 355 U. S. 962 (1958).
202364 F. 2d 161 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S.
987 (1966).
20343 N. J. 313, 204 A. 2d 146 (1964).
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amendment. The fact that the Supreme Court gives special con-
sideration to the need for immediacy and efficacy in preserving
the right to free speech 2 0 4 and has stated that first amendment
rights are preferred rights 2 0 5 would indicate that a counsel who
is ineffective in using litigation to redress the deprivation of a
client's constitutional rights would not meet the requirements
for a right to litigate. Lukewarm legal representation is a dis-
service to a client in any case, but it is particularly so in a
first amendment case. A counsel who lacks the sympathy or
determination to raise the first amendment issues and litigate
them properly undermines the whole purpose of bringing the
suit. First amendment cases often involve greater discretion
and call for more intricate strategy than other kinds of cases
with the result that a counsel who fails to utilize affirmative
suits or raise the issues as the case progresses can himself
insure that redress of the client's first amendment rights will
fail. Thus "effectiveness" of representation becomes an
important element in the right to litigate, requiring specialized
and courageous legal services as necessary elements of the
constitutional right itself.
The right to litigate in order to protect one's first
amendment rights is, like all constitutional rights, not an abso-
lute. There must be, however, a compelling state interest if it
is to be restricted. The Supreme Court stated NAACP v.
Button:
2 0 6
Thus it is no answer to the constitutional claims
• . . today. . that the purpose of these regulations
was merely to insure high professional standards and
not to curtail free expression. For a State may not
under the guise of prohibiting professional misconduct
ignore constitutional rights . . . . "In the domain of
these indispensable liberties whether of speech press
or association the decisions of this Court recognize
that abridgement of such rights, even though unintended
may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental
action. "
2 0 4 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
2 0 5 See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U. S. 116 (1966); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 169 (1959); Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,(1949);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 509 (1946).
206 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963).
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A balancing of the state's interests in regulating law
practice against the individual's first amendment rights is not
always easy, but the preferred nature of first amendment rights
and the increasingly questionable efficacy of outlawing out-of-
state civil rights attorneys tends to tip the scales in favor of
overriding the state interest. Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg
provides a good example of a balancing of interests which
resulted in a determination that the court rule refusing to per-
mit removal petitions to be signed by an out-of-state civil
rights attorney was an undue restriction upon first amendment
rights. The fact that this legal action arose out of the attempts
of Negroes in association to participate in free speech activities
and that the civil rights lawyer was providing his services with-
out charge were found persuasive: 2 0 7
In this context where the litigation is not brought for
private gain, any regulation of the practice of law must
show sufficient "substantial regulatory interest" . . .
to justify the-potential and actual inhibitory effects of
the regulation on the constitutionally protected right to
litigate.
The court determined that no such "substantial regulatory inter-
est" was sufficient to overrule the need for protection.
C. Right to Engage Out-of-State Attorney under Privileges and
Immunities Clause
The admission to practice cases have developed a rela-
tively recent federal right, based on the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the fourteenth amendment to hire an out-of-state
attorney of one's own choice. The privileges and immunities
clause, however, was so severely limited by Supreme Court
decisions years ago that it appeared that it could never be
revived. In the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases the Supreme Court
narrowed the clause to those rights inherent in national citizen-
ship such as the right to come to the seat of the government,
free access to seaports, protection of the government while on
the high seas, right to peaceably assemble and petition for re-
dress of grievances right to a writ of habeas corpus and right
to use navigable waters of the United States. 208 The privileges
and immunities clause has never quite recovered from this
207333 F. 2d 280, 286 (5th Cir. 1964).
208
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U. S. (16 Wall. ) 36 (1873).
See also Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
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limiting interpretation, although Justice Douglas has urged a
broadening interpretation in such opinions as Bell v. Mary-
land. 209
It has generally been held that thepractice of law in state
courts was not a privilege and immunity. Z10 However in 1966,
the Second Circuit in Spanos v. Skouras Threatres Corporation
held that under the privileges and immunities clause "no state
can prohibit a citizen with a federal claim or defense from
engaging an out-of-state lawyer to collaborate with an in-state
lawyer and give legal advice concerning it within the state. "211
The Spanos resuscitation of the privileges and immunities
clause as grounds for refusing to apply the state's unauthorized
practice laws has been criticized:
2 1 2
Since the need to retain out-of-state counsel was tied to
a federal claim or defense rather than to the right of
access to the federal courts it could well be maintained
that the court intended its ruling to apply to state court
proceedings as well. So applied, the court's decision
could be utilized to invalidate any state rule of practice,
the enforcement of which might hinder or prevent the
vindication of a federally created right.. With no narrower
criterion than the "necessary and appropriate" standard
of Spanos, statutes of limitations local pleading and dis-
covery rules, or requirements of security for costs,
could fall whenever a federal cause of action is asserted.
These critics argue that the Spanos result would more
properly have been reached by use of the supremacy clause, as
in Sperry v. Florida 213 than with the privileges and immunities
clause. But it is not clear that there would be any firmer stand-
ards under a supremacy clause analysis than under the privileges
209
378 U.S. 226, 242 (1963) (separate opinion by Douglas,
J.).
210 Se__e Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139
(1872); Starr v. State Board of Law Examiners, 159 F. 2d 305
(7th Cir. 1947).
211 364 F. 2d 161, 170 (2d Cir. 1966).
212
Note. Retaining Out-of-State Counsel: The Evolution
of a Federal Right, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 731, 744 (1967).
213373 U.S. 379 (1963).
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and immunities clause. The supremacy clause analysis which
speaks in terms of preemption of state authority to regulate cer-
tain areas of federal law is no easier to apply than the Spanos
doctrine that when out-of-state counsel are "necessary and
appropriate" for the assertion of a federal right, 214 the right
to such counsel is a privilege and immunity which cannot be
vitiated by state regulation or court rule. Both analyses re-
quire a balancing of federal concerns (whether denominated
rights or interests) against state interests in the particular
case. If in a particular case, state rules governing local
pleading do, in fact infringe upon federal concerns then those
rules like Judge Cox's rules concerning the acceptance of
removal petitions in Lefton v. City of Hattiesburg will have to
give way to the federal right or interest. The constitutional tag
which is used is less important than the result achieved and it
appears that many general state rules governing not only admis-
sion to law practice but also the running of courts may be sub-
ject to preemption by federal standards.
The Spanos court specifically limited its holding to non-
litigation legal services and stated that "we in no way sanction
a practice whereby a lawyer not admitted to practice by a state
maintains an office there and holds himself out to give advice to
all comers on federal matters. ,215 However, Spano s, unlike
civil rights cases involved a private attorney charging a fee for
specialized legal services which no doubt, could have been pro-
vided by a local New York attorney. In such a commercial set-
ting, the court had to set some limits to avoid creating, in
effect a right to the general practice of law in any state in
federal law matters. The court apparently recognized that its
narrow holding may not be necessary in a non-fee situation by
citing Lefton with approval and noting that "in instances where
the federal claim or defense is unpopular, advice and assistance
by an out-of-state lawyer may be the only means available for
vindication. "216
Spanos also viewed the right to hire an out-of-state
counsel as including the remedies necessary for its protection.
The court stated that "where a right has been conferred on citi-
zens by federal law, the constitutional guarantee against its
214See Spanos v. Skouras Theatres, Inc., 364 F. 2d 161,





abridgement must be read to include what is necessary and
appropriate for its assertion. ,,217 What is "necessary and
appropriate for its assertion" will vary from situation to situa-
tion. The fact that a civil rights lawyer, like Sobol, lives in
the state would not appear to be a crucial factor to prevent him
from being entitled to practice. If the federal right exists the
individual litigant should be entitled to representation by any
counsel who is needed to provide specialized representation as
provided by the California attorney in Spanos or free and
courageous representation, as offered by civil rights attorneys.
The fact that the federal right is based upon civil rights, rather
than federal anti-trust laws as in pnos gives a broader scope
to the use of necessary and appropriate remedies. The Fifth
Circuit said in Lefton:
2 1 8
In civil rights cases, however, Congress has directed
the federal courts to use that combination of federal law,
common law, and state law as will be best "adapted to
the object" of the civil rights laws. Rev. Stat. § 722
(1875), applying to Title XIII, Rev. Stat. ; 42 U. S. C. §
1988; see 28 U. S. C. § 1443, formerly Rev. Stat. § 641
(1875); 42 U. S.C. § 1988 Note. Therefore a federal
court is required to use common law powers to facilitate
and not to hinder "[p ]roceedings in vindication of civil
rights. " 42 U. S. C. § 1988.
The concern in Spanos for protecting a federal right and insuring
that a citizen has the same opportunity as the citizen of another
state to obtain specialized legal representation to preserve that
right is magnified in civil rights cases. The preferred nature
of civil rights and first amendment rights gives special urgency
to actions to insure their protection. The Spanos privilege and
immunity doctrine intended as it was to meet the problems
posed by federal economic regulations requiring legal specializa-
tion holds considerable promise for the non-fee civil rights
practice and its enlargement to cover out-of-state lawyers in
non-fee cases appears appropriate.
D. Right to Engage Out-of-State Counsel under Equal Protec-
tion of the Laws
The emphasis in Spanos upon insuring that a New York
resident has the same opportunity to obtain the legal services
217 Id.
218 333 F. 2d 280, 284 (th Cir. 1964).
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of a California federal antitrust expert as does a California resi-
dent sounds a bit like another constitutional provision, the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. It appears to be
properly expressed in terms of the privileges and immunities
clause because the difference in opportunity is clearly based
upon state residency. However, when the rights to particular
out-of-state counsel is viewed in the civil rights context, an
analysis in terms of equal protection of the law may be more
approprite. The Sobol complaint raised the issue in these
terms:2%
By long-established custom and usage, the State of
Louisiana, and particulary Plaquemines Paris denies
plaintiffs Duncan and Reynolds and the class plaintiffs
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th
Amendment by depriving them of opportunities for legal
representation, and for access to the courts, and for
legal advocacy in support of their rights, equal to the
opportunities which Louisiana and Plaquemines Parish
give persons not Negroes or civil rights workers; and
the State of Louisiana and Plaquemines Parish further
-deny plaintiffs Duncan and Reynolds and the class
plaintiffs the same right to sue, be parties, give evi-
dence and to the full and equal benefit of laws and pro-
ceedings for the security of person and property as are
enjoyed by white citizens, by depriving them of the same
opportunities for legal representation that are available
at the Louisiana bar to whites.
This argument recognizes that the practical effect of
enforcing the Louisiana unauthorized-practice statutes against
out-of-state civil rights workers is to close the doors of the
courts to many Negroes. The doctrine that state laws, although
within the state's police power and impartially enforced still
may not be permitted to result in de facto discrimination against
the poor has been enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griffin v.
Illinois 2 2 0 and Douglas v, California. 221 The denial of equal
protection is easier to see in Griffin where the state conditioned
appellate review on the presence of a stenographic transcript
for which an indigent would be unable to pay than in the case of
2 19 Amended complaint at 17, Sobol v. Perez, No. 67-
243 (E. D. La., July 22, 1968).
220
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
221372 U. S. 353 (1963).
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a Negro who is unable to obtain a local attorney. There is
clearly state action in the Griffin situation while it is more
difficult to find state action where private members of the bar
simply refuse to represent Negroes. An argument might be
made that lawyers are quasi-public officials and that due to the
monopoly they enjoy over the practice of law fostered by the
delegation of public functions over the regulation of law practice
to bar associations their refusal to represent Negroes consti-
tutes state action. 222 An argument might also be made under
an analysis similar to that advanced by the Solicitor General in
the government's brief to the Supreme Court in Bell v. Mary-
land, 223 that deprivation of opportunity for counsel for Negroes
is a residue from the state-enforced system of segregation
which required separate court facilities bar associations etc.,
and therefore may be considered state action. Obviously,
state action is not easily found, and as more civil rights lawyers
become members of southern bars and more young southern law
graduates indicate willingness to take civil rights cases, the
argument that private refusal of Negro cases by lawyers consti-
tutes state action will be even more difficult to make.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the Sobol and Sanders decisions failed to enunci-
ate a broad constitutional right for out-of-state attorneys to
practice in civil rights cases there are a number of hopeful
signs that legal protection will be extended to such practice.
Sobol and Sanders have severely limited the use of unauthorized
practice prosecutions and restrictive federal court rules to bar
out-of-state attorneys from civil rights practice, thus removing
the most effective weapons for barring out-of-state lawyers
from practice. In a non-civil rights context there are promis-
ing developments. The Spanos decision recognized a federal
interest in permitting an out-of-state attorney to practice in
2 2 2 See Black The Supreme Court 1966 Term: "State
Action " Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81
Harv. L. Rev. 69, 70-71 (1967): "I take the fourteenth amend-
ment's 'equal protection' clause to mean that members of a race
are to be shielded in the most ample way from any incidence of
governmental power that works their disadvantaging by virtue of
their race with all the distinguishing implications in this ample-
ness and in this application to race as a subject of special solici-
tude. " See also Bell v. Maryland, 378 U. S. 226, 242 (1964)
(separate opinion by Douglas, J.).
223378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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cases requiring specialized services to vindicate a federal right,
and the Appell decision acknowledged a similar federal interest
in cases with multi-state contacts.
Continued pressure to extend the boundaries of permissi-
ble practice by out-of-state attorneys can be expected in both
civil rights and non-civil rights areas. One likely area for
future evolution is poverty law. Poverty law programs have
likewise experienced problems with restrictive bar admission
rules. Like civil rights legal organizations, poverty law offices
require a particular type of lawyer who cannot always be found
among members of the state bar. It has been felt that an effec-
tive poverty law program requires lawyers with an interest and
an expertise in problems of the poor, a commitment to the use
of law to bring about changes in the condition of the poor, and a
willingness to accept a lower salary than is offered in private
practice. 224 Some poverty law programs have attracted the
hostility of local bar associations by activist programs (such as
the California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., which was sued by
the local bar association in 1967 to prevent it from opening a
neighborhood law office in Stanislaus County, California 2 2 5),
and poverty law programs have hired only members of the state
bar despite the severe limitations it sometimes places on their
224See Johnson, An Analysis of the OEO Legal Services
Program 38 Miss. L. J. 419 (1967); Voorhees, The OEO Legal
Services Program: Should the Bar Support It?, 53 A. B. A. J. 23
(1967); Greenwalt, Legal Services for the Poor; Challenge and
Opportunity for New York State 38 N. Y. S. B. J. 1 (1966);
Westwood, Legal Aid's Economic Opportunity, 52 A. B. A. J. 127
(1966); Berry, The National Conference on Law and Poverty, 51
A. B. A. J. 746 (1965).
2 2 5 See Stanislaus County Bar Assoc. v. California Rural
Legal Assistance Inc., No. 93302 (Dept. No. 4, Stanislaus
County Superior Court 1966) discussed in 7 Welfare Law Bulle-
tin 3 (1967). The complaint alleged that CRLA proposed to hire
persons to act as solicitors "under the guise of social workers"
in violation of the rules and laws governing the practice of law
in California. A temporary restraining order was issued but
was not renewed when it expired, and the office was opened.
Amicus curiae briefs were filed by the United States Department
of Justice and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association
on behalf of defendants. No decision was entered, apparently
for want of prosecution or for mootness. Letter from Don B.




recruitment. Another aspect of the poverty program which
could result in conflict with bar admission rules is the use of
non-lawyers in performing certain quasi-legal functions. For
example, if practice of law rules are interpreted strictly, the
preparation of a public housing complaint or counseling about
welfare laws by a social worker might be considered the prac-
tice of law. Justice Douglas 2 2 7 and a recent American Bar
Association committee study2 2 8 have taken the position that the
use of trained laymen to represent the poor in certain legal
matters is necessary and advisable.
Pressures arising out of civil rights and poverty law
situations will, no doubt, continue to cause conflict with the
tangled body of rules promulgated by a myriad of courts, legis-
latures and administrative bodies, which now limit the right to
practice law. There have been some broad proposals for reform
of the structure such as the creation of a National Board of Bar
Examiners, 2 2 9 "the creation of a "federal bar ,230 and the
application of conflicts of law doctrines and legislative guide-
lines to establish more definite provinces for state and federal
regulation of the practice of law. 231 One can only speculate on
2 2 6 Letters from the legal offices of five regional offices
of OEO (Mid-Atlantic, Great Lakes, North-Central, Southeast,
and Southwest) in the spring of 1968 to author indicated that
although there was interest in hiring lawyers who were not
members of the local bar, no attempt was being made to do so.
227
Hackin v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 146-49, 152 (1967).
228
The American Assembly on Law and the Changing
Society, sponsored by the A. B. A., recommended after its
March 14-17, 1968 meeting the "training of paraprofessionals
in the law schools to perform routine legal tasks under the
supervision of lawyers, and further expansion of public and pri-
vate legal aid defender services. " "Lawyers Must Lead Attack
on Nation's Urban Crisis American Assembly Consensus Report
Concludes " American Bar News, Vol. 13, No. 4 at 1 (April,
1968).
2 2 9 Joost Consolidation of Law Offices 53 A. B. A. J.
429, 431-32 (1967).
2 3 0 Note The Practice of Law by Out-of-State Attorneys
supra note 22, at 1300-01.
2 3 11d. at 1311-12.
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the possibilities for success of such broad reforms but it
seems clear that agitation will continue for freer access to
legal and judicial remedies through the assistance of special-
ized and sympathetic out-of-state lawyers. In the civil rights
area, the most restrictive limitations on practice by out-of-
state lawyers have now been overcome and it appears that
there are adequate precedents to establish a broad legal protec-
tion for practice by out-of-state attorneys in non-fee cases.
-133-

